Politicians predictably declare initiatives for domestic production of critical goods like munitions or rare earths when dependencies are exposed. However, these declarations rarely translate into effective action, suggesting we must learn to manage economic entanglement as a form of mutual deterrence rather than wish it away.

The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.

Counterintuitively, U.S. and global auto firms need to collaborate with Chinese suppliers to reduce strategic dependency. The model involves onshoring Chinese hardware and manufacturing expertise while maintaining national control over sensitive AI software and networks, creating a strategic "co-opetition."

Unlike the US's focus on quarterly results and election cycles, China's leadership operates on a civilizational timescale. From their perspective, the US is a recent phenomenon, and losing the US market is an acceptable short-term cost in a much longer game of survival and dominance. This fundamental difference in strategic thinking is often missed.

The shift to a less adversarial China policy may be a strategic maneuver to avoid supply chain disruptions. The U.S. appears to be biding its time—likely for 5+ years—to wean itself off dependence on Chinese rare earth minerals, which are critical for both industry and defense manufacturing.

While a unipolar world led by one's own country is advantageous, a multipolar world with competing powers like the U.S. and China creates a dynamic tension. This competition may force more compromised global decisions, potentially leading to a more balanced, albeit more tense, international system than one dominated by a single unchallenged power.

Unlike the old Cold War with Russia, the U.S. and China's deep economic interdependence prevents open conflict. The current "Rice War" is like water polo: while business and diplomacy occur on the surface, a covert intelligence and influence war rages underneath.

The modern belief that deep economic ties between the U.S. and China will prevent war echoes Norman Angell's 1910 bestseller, "The Great Illusion." That book argued European economies were too intertwined for a major war, a theory tragically debunked just four years later by World War I.

Contrary to common perception, China holds the stronger hand in its relationship with the U.S. As the world's creditor and primary producer, China can sell its goods to billions of other global consumers. The U.S., as a debtor and consumer nation, is far more dependent on China than the other way around.