Governments with massive debt cannot afford to keep interest rates high, as refinancing becomes prohibitively expensive. This forces central banks to lower rates and print money, even when it fuels asset bubbles. The only exits are an unprecedented productivity boom (like from AI) or a devastating economic collapse.
After a decade of zero rates and QE post-2008, the financial system can no longer function without continuous stimulus. Attempts to tighten policy, as seen with the 2018 repo crisis, immediately cause breakdowns, forcing central banks to reverse course and indicating a permanent state of intervention.
When national debt grows too large, an economy enters "fiscal dominance." The central bank loses its ability to manage the economy, as raising rates causes hyperinflation to cover debt payments while lowering them creates massive asset bubbles, leaving no good options.
Citing Sidney Homer's "A History of Interest Rates," the speaker notes that the recent period of zero interest rates is unique across 4,000 years of financial history. This anomaly is forcing governments into debt monetization, as traditional tools are exhausted, creating a situation unlike any seen before.
Unlike the post-GFC era, governments now lack the fiscal and monetary flexibility to cushion every economic shock due to high debt levels. This is forcing global markets to trade on their own fundamentals again, creating volatility and relative value opportunities reminiscent of the pre-2008 era.
A condition called "fiscal dominance," where massive government debt exists, prevents the central bank from raising interest rates to cool speculation. This forces a flood of cheap money into the market, which seeks high returns in narrative-driven assets like AI because safer options can't keep pace with inflation.
Due to massive government debt, the Fed's tools work paradoxically. Raising rates increases the deficit via higher interest payments, which is stimulative. Cutting rates is also inherently stimulative. The Fed is no longer controlling inflation but merely choosing the path through which it occurs.
Despite recent concerns about private credit quality, the most rapid and substantial growth in debt since the GFC has occurred in the government sector. This makes the government bond market, not private credit, the most likely source of a future systemic crisis, especially in a rising rate environment.
With debt-to-GDP at 130%, the implicit policy is to use inflation to devalue the debt burden. This is becoming explicit, with proposals like using tariff money for direct stimulus checks. This strategy favors risk assets and creates a 'full on euphoria tech bubble' if real yields go negative again.
The U.S. government's debt is so large that the Federal Reserve is trapped. Raising interest rates would trigger a government default, while cutting them would further inflate the 'everything bubble.' Either path leads to a systemic crisis, a situation economists call 'fiscal dominance.'
In periods of 'fiscal dominance,' where government debt and deficits are high, a central bank's independence inevitably erodes. Its primary function shifts from controlling inflation to ensuring the government can finance its spending, often through financial repression like yield curve control.