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The argument that AI doomers should short the market if they truly believe in existential risk is flawed. As pointed out in the discussion, such bets are nonsensical because in a world-ending scenario, there would be no one left to collect the winnings, making it an impractical measure of belief.
Economist Tyler Cowen argues that if AI doom scenarios are credible, proponents should be able to provide quantifiable estimates of the economic damage and prove their conviction by shorting relevant stocks.
If one truly believes AI poses a non-trivial extinction risk, utilitarian ethics can lead to an alarming conclusion: extreme actions, including violence, are justified to prevent a catastrophically greater harm. This presents a core philosophical paradox for the AI safety movement.
Unlike past technological shifts, AI's ultimate impact is subject to violent disagreement among the world's top experts, including Nobel laureates. The spectrum of potential outcomes ranges from global utopia to human extinction, representing a historically unprecedented level of uncertainty that makes investment and planning exceptionally difficult.
Many top AI CEOs openly admit the extinction-level risks of their work, with some estimating a 25% chance. However, they feel powerless to stop the race. If a CEO paused for safety, investors would simply replace them with someone willing to push forward, creating a systemic trap where everyone sees the danger but no one can afford to hit the brakes.
Economist Tyler Cowen argues that serious AI fears should be convertible into financial bets. However, the unique nature of existential risk (X-Risk) makes this logic fail; if humanity is wiped out, there's no one to collect the payout, making the bet meaningless.
The leaders of top AI labs have signed statements acknowledging AI could cause human extinction. Yet, a safety report gives them failing grades on 'existential safety,' finding it jarring that these same leaders are actively building superintelligence without any articulated plan for how to maintain human control over the technology.
Nuclear game theory relies on a shared desire to avoid an omni-lose scenario. AI game theory is different: if destruction is seen as inevitable, the creator of the world-ending AI might perceive a 'win' if that AI bears their company's logo or legacy, removing the incentive to cooperate.
While the AI capex boom may seem unsustainable, the mechanics of shorting it (e.g., buying puts) reveal the extreme difficulty of the trade. The bet requires being correct not just on the eventual downturn but on its precise timing. The risk of losing the entire premium makes it an unattractive risk-adjusted bet.
Unlike traditional risk hedging where you sacrifice upside, the AI boom has turned the "put option on humanity" into a "call option on technology." Early believers in AI's world-changing (and potentially world-ending) potential became fabulously wealthy by investing in the very technology they feared, creating an unprecedented financial alignment where doomers profit.
A unique feature of the AI boom is that those who feared its existential risks often became the wealthiest. By being early to the thesis, they invested in foundational tech like GPUs, turning their "put option on humanity" into a lucrative call option on the technology itself.