China's showcase of advanced military hardware, like its new aircraft carrier, is primarily a psychological tool. The strategy is to build a military so 'forbiddingly huge' that the US would hesitate to engage, allowing China to achieve goals like reabsorbing Taiwan without fighting. This suggests their focus is on perceived power to deter intervention.

The PLA's nuclear expansion is a defensive strategy to achieve "strategic counterbalance." The goal is to build a secure second-strike capability (a "nuclear shield") that makes any US nuclear first strike untenable, thereby deterring American intervention in a conventional regional conflict.

Predicting PLA performance is uniquely hard because it hasn't fought since 1979. Unlike analysts studying Russia before its 2022 invasion, those studying China must rely on doctrine and exercises, which can be misleading indicators of true battlefield capability and create significant uncertainty.

The PLA's 2027 objectives are defined by three specific pillars: "strategic counterbalance" (keeping the US out), "strategic decisive victory" (winning a Taiwan conflict), and "strategic deterrence and control" (stabilizing the periphery). Understanding this framework is key to deciphering their priorities.

Modern asymmetric warfare is less about ground skirmishes and more about economic attrition through missile technology. Adversaries use extremely cheap drones and mines to exhaust the multi-million-dollar missile defense systems of better-equipped powers, creating a lopsided cost exchange.

Analyzing public PLA doctrine offers a unique window into their strategic thinking and perceptions. This "big picture" view complements the granular, technical detail found in classified intelligence, which often focuses on specific capabilities while missing the broader strategic intent.

The primary function of missile defense is not to achieve victory but to prevent a rapid defeat by thwarting initial attacks. This buys crucial time for offensive forces to neutralize threats by other means. While its absence can lose a war quickly, its presence alone is not a winning strategy.

Simulations of a conflict with China consistently show the US depleting its high-end munitions in about seven days. The industrial base then requires two to three years to replenish these stockpiles, revealing a massive gap between military strategy and production capacity that undermines deterrence.

The PLA learns from US operations that massive firepower campaigns are insufficient to achieve political goals. This reinforces the historical truth that airpower and missile strikes alone do not force capitulation, making a ground invasion necessary for their Taiwan objectives.