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Wigglesworth says Jay Cooke got sucked into the transcontinental railway mania and was left holding Northern Pacific bonds when European investors pulled back. With no Federal Reserve to supply liquidity, his bank's failure became a psychological shock and helped trigger the Long Depression one of the biggest crises.

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The Federal Reserve encouraged banks to buy long-term treasuries while signaling low rates, only to then hike rates at a historic pace. This action decimated the value of those bonds, making the world's 'safest asset' the riskiest and directly triggering bank collapses like Silicon Valley Bank.

Wigglesworth says Barings and Hope & Co underwrote the $15 million Louisiana Purchase because the US lacked cash, selling bonds to France. With no limited liability, the bankers bore enormous risk. Their letters reveal they feared the deal could fail and land them in debtors' prison.

Wigglesworth contrasts the dot-com crash with bond market breaks, noting the NASDAQ fell sharply but the recession was short and shallow. He says when assets presumed safe collapse, the shock is larger because it feels like money itself is dying, and that produces nastier economic outcomes.

When investors stop buying government bonds, the central bank is forced to print money to cover the debt. The market anticipates this, triggering a self-fulfilling prophecy of high inflation, which effectively devalues the debt and impoverishes citizens.

The two-decade deflation after 1873 crushed debtors like farmers, creating a potent populist backlash. This economic pain, where debts grew in real terms while incomes fell, proved a more powerful driver for conspiracy theories than inflation. It led to blaming British bankers in the US and the rise of economic anti-Semitism in Europe.

Core components of today's financial landscape, including FDIC insurance, Social Security, and even the 30-year mortgage, were not products of gradual evolution. They were specific policies created rapidly out of the financial ashes of the Great Depression, demonstrating how systemic shocks can accelerate fundamental structural reforms.

After a deep equity bear market, European savers sought alternatives to low-yielding government bonds. They poured capital into higher-risk global bonds, especially for railroads, creating the conditions for the 1873 crisis. This illustrates how past trauma can shape future risk appetite and create new bubbles in seemingly 'safer' asset classes.

The failure of Silicon Valley Bank was not an isolated event but a predictable outcome of a global issue. Many entities, including pension funds and insurance companies, are "leveraged long" on government bonds whose values plummeted as interest rates rose.

The trauma of the 1929 crash created a lasting aversion to stock market investing. Andrew Ross Sorkin notes his grandfather witnessed the crash as a boy and never bought a stock in his life. This shows how crises can shatter a nation's financial psyche for generations, impacting wealth creation.

The Federal Reserve, a relatively new institution in 1929, acted timidly due to political pressure. It failed to curb rampant speculation before the crash and then hesitated to inject liquidity after, fearing it would lose its authority. This inaction, born from political weakness, was a key lesson that informed the aggressive response to the 2008 crisis.