When polled, virtually no Limited Partners (LPs) admit to having a median or below-median private equity portfolio. This collective overconfidence is a powerful behavioral bias that sustains demand for the asset class, as everyone believes they can outperform the average even if market returns compress.
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The market's liquidity crisis is driven by a fundamental disagreement. Limited Partners (LPs) suspect that long-held assets are overvalued, while General Partners (GPs) refuse to sell at a discount, fearing it will damage their track record (IRR/MOIC) and future fundraising ability. This creates a deadlock.
There's a surprising disconnect between the perceived brilliance of individual investors at large, well-known private equity firms and their actual net-to-LP returns, which are often no better than the market median. This violates the assumption that top talent automatically generates outlier results.
Historically, private equity was pursued for its potential outperformance (alpha). Today, with shrinking public markets, its main value is providing diversification and access to a growing universe of private companies that are no longer available on public exchanges. This makes it a core portfolio completion tool.
Underperforming VC firms persist because the 7-10+ year feedback loop for returns allows them to raise multiple funds before performance is clear. Additionally, most LPs struggle to distinguish between a manager's true investment skill and market-driven luck.
Post-mortems of bad investments reveal the cause is never a calculation error but always a psychological bias or emotional trap. Sequoia catalogs ~40 of these, including failing to separate the emotional 'thrill of the chase' from the clinical, objective assessment required for sound decision-making.
People justify high-risk strategies by retroactively fitting themselves into a successful subgroup (e.g., 'Yes, most investors fail, but *smart* ones succeed, and I am smart'). This is 'hindsight gerrymandering'—using a trait like 'smartness,' which can only be proven after the fact, to create a biased sample and rationalize the risk.
Private equity's low reported correlation with public markets is largely an illusion created by smoothed, infrequent valuations ("volatility laundering"). The effect is exaggerated when institutions report private asset returns with a one-quarter lag, creating "accounting diversification" instead of real risk reduction.
The private equity market has abundant capital and willing companies, yet transactions are stalled. This is because General Partners (GPs) fear selling at low returns and Limited Partners (LPs) fear over-commitment due to liquidity concerns, creating a gridlock where no one wants to act.
Investors are drawn to PE's smooth, bond-like volatility reporting. However, the underlying assets are small, highly indebted companies, which are inherently much riskier than public equities. This mismatch between perceived risk (low) and actual risk (high) creates a major portfolio allocation error.
While limited partners in venture funds often claim to seek differentiated strategies, in reality, they prefer minor deviations from established models. They want the comfort of the familiar with a slight "alpha" twist, making it difficult for managers with genuinely unconventional approaches to raise institutional capital.
