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Sam Lessin notes his fund experiences roughly a one percent fraud rate, while Jason Calacanis estimates his at two and a half percent. Lessin argues that having zero fraud in an early-stage portfolio indicates an investor is not taking enough creative risk or saying yes aggressively enough to capture massive asymmetric upside.

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Jason Calacanis reviews cap tables from FTX and Nikola to illustrate how prominent growth firms collectively suspended disbelief. Rather than conducting rigorous independent product testing, prestigious institutions poured billions into fraudulent startups simply because they assumed previous tier-one investors had already done the work.

Businesses and financial institutions intentionally accept a certain level of fraud. The friction required to eliminate it entirely would block too many legitimate transactions, ultimately costing more in lost revenue (lower conversion) than the fraud itself. It is a calculated trade-off between security and usability.

Top growth investors deliberately allocate more of their diligence effort to understanding and underwriting massive upside scenarios (10x+ returns) rather than concentrating on mitigating potential downside. The power-law nature of venture returns makes this a rational focus for generating exceptional performance.

In venture capital, a portfolio with no failed investments is a sign of a flawed, risk-averse strategy. The goal isn't to avoid losses but to back the market leader in a potentially huge category. Losing money on the leader if the entire category fails is an acceptable and expected outcome.

The absence of significant flaws or negative perspectives on a deal is a red flag, suggesting something was missed in diligence. True exceptionality is what carries a great investment, not a lack of risk. If everyone agrees it's a great deal, you're likely too late or wrong.

To combat fraud, some credit funds use the prospective borrower's due diligence deposit to fund deep background checks on founders and management as the very first step. Any past financial impropriety, no matter how old, results in an immediate rejection, making recent high-profile frauds avoidable.

Sam Lessin explains that seed investing is designed to absorb frequent total losses for rare asymmetry, whereas growth investing prioritizes capital preservation. He argues that spending extensive diligence resources on a small check makes no mathematical sense, while writing a hundred-million-dollar check demands rigorous verification.

Investment team members often conflate raising potential risks with having weak conviction, which damages intellectual honesty. Highlighting portfolio hazards and deal flaws is essential due diligence, and teams should actively encourage uncovering warts before committing capital.

Sequoia's internal philosophy dictates that venture capital is not a downside minimization game. A fund with a write-off rate below 40% is seen as not taking enough risk to generate outlier returns. This counter-intuitive metric prioritizes bold bets over preserving capital on every deal.

In competitive funding rounds, investors may rely on the diligence of other VCs in the deal. This is a major pitfall, as founders can leverage momentum and social proof to dissuade individual scrutiny. This "diligence by proxy" enabled frauds like FTX and Theranos.