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Historical analysis of distressed cycles in sectors like energy and retail shows that roughly one-third of the industry's debt defaulted over a two-year period. Applying this precedent to the software sector, which has approximately $300 billion in debt, suggests a potential default wave of around $100 billion if current pressures continue.

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The market is indiscriminately punishing all software debt, creating bargains in quality companies with strong free cash flow. These firms will likely now prioritize paying down debt over M&A, mirroring the successful recovery playbook seen in the energy sector a decade ago.

J.P. Morgan has significantly increased its 2027 default forecast for leveraged loans by 100 basis points to 4.5%, citing disruption in the software sector. In contrast, the forecast for high-yield bonds was only raised by 25 basis points to 2.25%, highlighting a dramatic divergence in expected credit performance between the two asset classes.

With fewer traditional credit cycles, the most fertile ground for distressed investing lies in industry-specific downturns caused by technological or policy shifts. These "microcycles" offer opportunities to invest in good companies working through temporary, concentrated disruption.

Angelo Ruffino of Bain Capital forecasts that default rates in the software lending sector will significantly exceed the broader leveraged loan market average of 4-5%, potentially reaching high single-digit or even low double-digit percentages due to AI disruption and over-leverage.

Software's heavy presence in leveraged loan (<15%) and private credit (>20%) portfolios makes these markets more vulnerable to AI disruption than high-yield bonds (<5%). This concentration risk is already visible, with the distressed universe of leveraged loans growing 50% year-to-date, a stress not yet seen in the bond market.

Unlike the great financial crisis, recent credit cycles have been confined to specific sectors (e.g., energy, and now potentially software) rather than broad, macro-driven downturns. Without the ingredients for a deep recession, current stress in software is unlikely to cause contagion across the wider credit markets.

Unlike past recessions where defaults spike and then recede, the current high-rate environment will keep financially weak 'zombie' companies struggling for longer. This leads to a sustained, elevated default rate rather than a sharp, temporary peak, as these firms lack the cash flow to grow or refinance.

Once considered safe due to low CapEx and recurring revenue models, the technology sector now shows significant credit stress. Investors allowed higher leverage on these companies, but the sharp rise in interest rates in 2022 exposed this vulnerability, placing tech alongside historically troubled sectors like media and retail.

While software exposure is a serious concern for credit markets, it is unlikely to cause a systemic crisis. Mitigating factors include low leverage in BDCs (around 2x), minimal direct linkage to the core banking system, and a recent corporate credit cycle characterized by de-leveraging rather than aggressive debt accumulation.

Roughly one-third of the private credit and syndicated loan markets consist of software LBOs financed before the AI boom. Goodwin argues this concentration is "horrendous portfolio construction." As AI disrupts business models, these highly levered portfolios face clustered defaults with poor recoveries, a risk many are ignoring.