European pension funds invest just 0.02% in venture capital (vs. 2% in the US) because their core mission is capital preservation. Overcoming this requires more than just education; it needs structural solutions like EIB-backed fund-of-funds vehicles to simplify and de-risk VC exposure for these conservative institutions.

Unlike tech investing, where a single power-law outlier can return the entire fund, biotech wins are smaller in magnitude. This dynamic forces biotech VCs to prioritize a higher success rate across their portfolio rather than solely hunting for one massive unicorn.

The huge funding gap for European biotech is structural. European institutional investors like pension funds allocate only 0.02% of their balance sheets to venture, compared to 2% in the US. This factor-of-100 difference creates a major hurdle for the ecosystem's ability to retain its champion companies.

Large, multi-stage funds can pay any price for seed rounds because the check size is immaterial to their fund's success. They view seed investments not on their own return potential, but as an option to secure pro-rata rights in future, massive growth rounds.

Despite high returns, large VCs avoid seed investing because it's operationally intense (requiring 10-25x more meetings), access to top founders is a bottleneck, and their large funds require deploying big checks that are incompatible with small seed round sizes.

A smaller fund size enables investments in seemingly niche but potentially lucrative sectors, such as software for dental labs. A larger fund would have to pass on such a deal, not because the founder is weak, but because the potential exit isn't large enough to satisfy their fund return model.

Unlike their US counterparts, European biotechs have less access to large venture funds. This forces a culture of extreme capital efficiency and discipline. This need to be "cleverer, smarter with less people and less money" is a defining feature and potential advantage of the European ecosystem.

In venture capital, mid-sized generalist funds struggle to compete. They lack the scale and network of large generalists and the deep expertise of small specialists. This 'death of the middle' makes it difficult for them to win the best, most competitive deals against firms that can offer either breadth or depth.

The venture capital landscape is bifurcating. Large, multi-stage funds leverage scale and network, while small, boutique funds win with deep domain expertise. Mid-sized generalist funds lack a clear competitive edge and risk getting squeezed out by these two dominant models.