Unlike the US, both Labour Prime Minister Jim Callaghan and his Conservative successor Margaret Thatcher refused to allow the deposed Shah into Britain. They correctly assessed that doing so would endanger their own embassy staff in Tehran, a decision that likely prevented a parallel hostage crisis.

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The Shah’s power was tainted by foreign intervention: his father's British-backed coup and his own ascension after the British forced his father to abdicate. This narrative of being a foreign puppet permanently undermined his domestic legitimacy and was exploited by his opponents.

The students who seized the US Embassy did not plan a 444-day ordeal. Their original plan was a brief, symbolic occupation to protest US policy, inspired by Western student sit-ins. They brought only enough food for three days, showing their lack of foresight for the crisis's escalation.

The Carter administration was explicitly warned by its own diplomats that allowing the deposed Shah into the US would provoke an attack on the Tehran embassy. Carter, aware of the risk, ultimately relented due to humanitarian pressure and political concerns about appearing disloyal.

The defining political and cultural conflict of modern Britain is the ideological battle between Clement Attlee and Margaret Thatcher. Attlee established the post-war socialist consensus (NHS, welfare state), while Thatcher introduced radical individualism and free-market capitalism, creating a lasting tension that shapes the nation today.

Days before Iran's 1978 revolution, President Jimmy Carter lauded the Shah's leadership and Iran's "stability." This highlights a catastrophic failure of intelligence and a reliance on superficial state-level relationships over understanding ground-level dissent.

The U.S. Embassy and CIA were unaware that the Shah was dying of leukemia, dismissing rumors as Russian propaganda. This critical intelligence gap meant they couldn't understand his indecisiveness and erratic behavior as the crisis escalated, misreading the entire situation.

The Shah was seen as a repressive autocrat, yet he was indecisive when confronted with mass protests, partly due to his illness. This politically toxic combination alienated the people through repression while emboldening them through weakness, creating the perfect conditions for his downfall.

The White House assumed the hostage crisis was a negotiation over specific demands, such as returning the Shah. In reality, Khomeini used the prolonged crisis to eliminate moderate rivals and consolidate the Islamic Republic, making the stated demands largely irrelevant.

The Shah believed the US was masterminding events in Iran, a comforting illusion that someone was in control. The reality—that the US government was paralyzed by indecision and had no plan—was far more terrifying. This realization shattered his confidence and sealed his fate.

Ayatollah Khomeini's political genius was blending traditional religious conservatism with the era's fashionable anti-colonial nationalism. By framing the Shah as an American and Israeli puppet, he mobilized a broad coalition beyond just the deeply religious.