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Jordan notes the Match Act's 150-day window gives China time to stockpile. Brown says China may import tens or over a hundred systems, but once exports stop, the strategic ceiling over ten years remains; stockpiling mainly softens the immediate blow.
Nick Brown says the bill would move advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including DUV immersion, from entity-specific restrictions to countrywide controls. It also aligns Dutch and Japanese controls on all SME to SMIC and CXMT with US rules, after a 150-day negotiation window.
Brown says the bill is good for US and allied chipmakers because Huawei and CXMT could otherwise use imported lithography to flood markets with advanced chips. That would eat into margins for Nvidia, AMD, Intel, Samsung, SK Hynix, and others.
Brown says CSET reports show China making inroads in etch, deposition, and CMP, but it still has zero meaningful lithography market share. He expects lithography to be the hardest and last tool China indigenizes, making current lithography stockpiles a useful long-term bound.
Brown notes ASML's light sources come from Cymer in the US or Gigaphoton in Japan. If Japan aligns on DUV, the US and Japan can block all immersion systems to China through national light-source controls without using extraterritorial FDPR authority.
Brown says if China keeps importing lithography at its 2024-25 pace and shifts a larger share to AI, the curve bends upward. In that AI-push scenario, China could reach near parity or parity with US chipmaking in about ten years.
Brown's modeling assumes China diverts its entire DUV stockpile to advanced fabs and spends all of it on AI chips. Even under that extreme scenario, physics and lithography throughput leave China well below a tenth of US AI chip production through 2035.
China will likely struggle to indigenously manufacture commercial DUV immersion lithography tools until the mid-2030s, long after domesticating deposition or etch tools. Because only Japan and the Netherlands produce them, lithography remains the West's most durable geopolitical lever.
Brown ran a scenario where China prototypes a seven-nanometer-equivalent DUV next year, reaches commercial production the year after, and scales 100% annually. Even then, existing stockpile plus indigenous production does not come close to US-allied production if imports are cut off.
Existing export restrictions left older DUV immersion systems unrestricted, allowing China to double its installed base. Halting all DUV tool flows could cap China's domestic chip production at roughly 10 million chips annually, maintaining a massive US compute advantage.
Brown and the hosts argue Match Act import bans will not crater China's chip output overnight; effects build over years, especially for item exports. Unlike 2025 tariff shocks or the 50% rule, this slower burn may not trigger acute retaliation.