Modern monetary policy is a deliberate trade-off: prevent a 1929-style depression by accepting perpetual, slow-moving inflation. This strategy, however, systematically punishes savers and wage-earners while enriching asset owners, creating a 'K-shaped' economy where the wealth gap consistently widens.

Traditional analysis links real GDP growth to corporate profits. However, in an inflationary period, strong nominal growth can flow directly to revenues and boost profits even if real output contracts, especially if wage growth lags. This makes nominal figures a better indicator for equity markets.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, re-accelerating inflation can be a positive for stocks. It indicates that corporations have regained pricing power, which boosts earnings growth. This improved earnings outlook can justify a lower equity risk premium, allowing for higher stock valuations.

Contrary to popular belief, the 1929 crash wasn't an instantaneous event. It took a full year for public confidence to erode and for the new reality to set in. This illustrates that markets can absorb financial shocks, but they cannot withstand a sustained, spiraling loss of confidence.

While low rates and high nominal growth typically favor equities, financial repression introduces a counterintuitive risk. If institutions are forced to buy government bonds, they must sell liquid assets—primarily equities. This could lead to a slow, multi-year decline in the S&P 500, mirroring the 1966-1982 period, instead of a sudden crash.

Market participants are conditioned to expect a dramatic "Minsky moment." However, the more probable reality is a slow, grinding decline characterized by a decade of flat equity prices, compressing multiples, and degrading returns—a "death by a thousand cuts" rather than one catastrophic event.

While consumers might see 0% inflation as perfect, economists consider it dangerous because it is perilously close to deflation. Deflation can cripple an economy by encouraging consumers to delay spending and increasing the real value of debt, making it a state to be actively avoided.

The post-COVID era of high government spending has ushered in a new economic paradigm. The elongated 10-year cycles of 1980-2020 are gone, replaced by shorter, more intense two-year bull markets followed by one-year downturns. This framework suggests we are currently in the early stages of a new up cycle.

The current economic cycle is unlikely to end in a classic nominal slowdown where everyone loses their jobs. Instead, the terminal risk is a resurgence of high inflation, which would prevent the Federal Reserve from providing stimulus and could trigger a 2022-style market downturn.