Counter to conventional value investing wisdom, a low Price-to-Earnings (P/E) ratio is often a "value trap" that exists for a valid, negative reason. A high P/E, conversely, is a more reliable indicator that a stock may be overvalued and worth selling. This suggests avoiding cheap stocks is more important than simply finding them.
Cisco's stock took 25 years to reclaim its year-2000 peak, despite the underlying business growing significantly. This serves as a stark reminder that even a successful, growing company can deliver zero returns for decades if an investor buys in at an extremely high, bubble-era valuation.
Citing legendary investor Peter Lynch, Cramer warns that an exceptionally low price-to-earnings ratio is often a red flag, not a value play. The market is correctly pricing in a future collapse of earnings. He uses the example of Bethlehem Steel, which traded at 2x earnings just two years before going bankrupt.
Contrary to popular belief, earnings growth has a very low correlation with decadal stock returns. The primary driver is the change in the valuation multiple (e.g., P/E ratio expansion or contraction). The correlation between 10-year real returns and 10-year valuation changes is a staggering 0.9, while it is tiny for earnings growth.
With the S&P 500's Price-to-Earnings ratio near 28 (almost double the historic average) and the Shiller P/E near 40, the stock market is priced for perfection. These high valuation levels have historically only been seen right before major market corrections, suggesting a very thin safety net for investors.
Wagner's strategy shifted from buying statistically cheap companies to requiring a clear catalyst for value realization. He found that without a catalyst, even correctly underwritten cheap stocks would continue to decline due to factors like technological disruption, making the old "cigar butt" approach obsolete.
In the world of hyper-short-term pod shops, a stock being "cheap" is a sign of a broken thesis, not a value opportunity. This highlights a fundamental philosophical divide where traditional value investors see opportunity, while pods see a reason to sell immediately.
Current market multiples appear rich compared to history, but this view may be shortsighted. The long-term earnings potential unleashed by AI, combined with a higher-quality market composition, could make today's valuations seem artificially high ahead of a major earnings inflection.
Traditional valuation multiples are increasingly misleading because GAAP rules expense intangible investments (R&D, brand building) rather than capitalizing them. For a company like Microsoft, properly capitalizing these investments can drop its P/E ratio from 35 to 30, revealing a more attractive valuation.
Anchoring valuation on a company's typical price-to-sales ratio helps identify buying opportunities when margins are temporarily depressed. This avoids the pitfalls of methods like the Magic Formula, which can mistakenly favor companies at their cyclical earnings peaks, leading to underperformance.
In a late-stage bubble, investor expectations are so high that even flawless financial results, like Nvidia's record-breaking revenue, fail to boost the stock price. This disconnect signals that market sentiment is saturated and fragile, responding more to narrative than fundamentals.