A surge in highly speculative assets may not indicate a strong economy. It can be a sign that people feel so far behind financially that they're placing huge bets, believing in an "only up" market out of desperation rather than confidence.

Widespread public debate about whether a market is in a bubble is evidence that it is not. A true financial bubble requires capitulation, where nearly everyone believes the high valuations are justified and the skepticism disappears. As long as there are many vocal doubters, the market has not reached the euphoric peak that precedes a crash.

Current anxiety surrounding China is largely confined to policy and financial circles, lacking the broad public and pop culture resonance that characterized the fear of Japan's economic rise in the 1980s, which permeated movies, media, and consumer attitudes.

Japan sustains a debt-to-GDP ratio that would cause collapse elsewhere due to its unique culture. Citizens patriotically buy and hold government debt, preventing the market panic that would typically ensue. This cultural factor allows it to delay an economic reckoning that seems inevitable by standard metrics.

Contrary to intuition, widespread fear and discussion of a market bubble often precede a final, insane surge upward. The real crash tends to happen later, when the consensus shifts to believing in a 'new economic model.' This highlights a key psychological dynamic of market cycles where peak anxiety doesn't signal an immediate top.

As investors sell US assets to repay strengthening yen loans, it pulls liquidity from the US system. If this happens slowly, it could gently deflate inflated stock prices without causing a crash. This orderly withdrawal is preferable to a sudden market rupture caused by bursting bubbles.

During its boom, Japan's industrial policy and close bank-firm relationships were admired as strengths. After the bubble burst, these same traits were immediately relabeled as crony capitalism and systemic flaws, showing how quickly dominant narratives about national economic models can invert.

The public sentiment towards minority groups, particularly historical scapegoats, can function as a canary in the coal mine for a nation's economic health. When fear and economic anxiety rise, society seeks a focus for its anger, making the "temperature on the Jews" a critical, if grim, socio-economic indicator.

The "Japan panic" was rooted in fears of economic subordination—like having a Japanese boss or seeing landmarks bought by Japanese firms. In contrast, anxiety about China is dominated by concerns over direct military conflict and a technological arms race, a much starker form of geopolitical rivalry.