Current anxiety surrounding China is largely confined to policy and financial circles, lacking the broad public and pop culture resonance that characterized the fear of Japan's economic rise in the 1980s, which permeated movies, media, and consumer attitudes.
Related Insights
Unlike the 1980s, when Japanese corporations were common antagonists in films like Die Hard, modern Hollywood avoids portraying China negatively. This is attributed to a desire to maintain access to China's lucrative box office, resulting in a pop culture landscape that doesn't reflect geopolitical tensions.
Public and political fear of Japanese economic takeover reached its zenith in the early 1990s, with books like Michael Crichton's "Rising Sun." Ironically, this coincided with the bursting of Japan's asset bubble, highlighting a critical lag between economic reality and popular discourse.
The anxiety driving protectionism in the West stems from seeing other nations catch up, not from an absolute decline in living standards. This psychological fear of losing the top spot undermines national confidence and can trigger a dangerous, self-defeating shift toward isolationism.
The core driver of a 'Thucydides Trap' conflict is the psychological distress experienced by the ruling power. For the U.S., the challenge to its identity as '#1' creates a disorienting fear and paranoia, making it prone to miscalculation, independent of actual military or economic shifts.
Japan sustains a debt-to-GDP ratio that would cause collapse elsewhere due to its unique culture. Citizens patriotically buy and hold government debt, preventing the market panic that would typically ensue. This cultural factor allows it to delay an economic reckoning that seems inevitable by standard metrics.
From a Chinese perspective, its vast manufacturing capacity, supported by world-class infrastructure, is a global utility. The concept of "Made in China" is reframed as "Made for the World." This view suggests the U.S. should focus on its own strengths like innovation ("zero to one") instead of viewing China's manufacturing prowess ("one to 100") as a national security threat.
China's inner circle, led by Xi Jinping, believes the U.S. is in terminal decline. They view American social and political paradoxes—like New York, the center of capitalism, electing a socialist—not as features of a complex democracy, but as evidence of a fracturing and decaying society.
During its boom, Japan's industrial policy and close bank-firm relationships were admired as strengths. After the bubble burst, these same traits were immediately relabeled as crony capitalism and systemic flaws, showing how quickly dominant narratives about national economic models can invert.
The "Japan panic" was rooted in fears of economic subordination—like having a Japanese boss or seeing landmarks bought by Japanese firms. In contrast, anxiety about China is dominated by concerns over direct military conflict and a technological arms race, a much starker form of geopolitical rivalry.
Trump's consistent economic nationalism is not a recent phenomenon but is deeply rooted in the 1980s. He publicly railed against Japanese trade practices and high-profile investments in American assets, demonstrating that his protectionist instincts are a core, long-held belief.