While Scipio was a brilliant commander, Rome's ultimate victory stemmed from its institutional advantages. Decades of war had forged a superior, well-drilled infantry, and its vast manpower reserves gave it an edge Carthage, reliant on mercenaries, could not match. Hannibal lost at Zama primarily because he lacked the cavalry that Rome's institutional might could now field against him.

After Cannae, Rome couldn't defeat Hannibal in open battle, so they adopted a strategy of avoidance, creating a stalemate. For a power on the brink of collapse, simply surviving is a form of victory. This prolonged timeline allowed Rome to regroup, rebuild its manpower, and ultimately go on the offensive.

The Roman war in Spain was less about territorial conquest and more a strategic effort to stop reinforcements from reaching Hannibal in Italy. By engaging Carthaginian forces under Hasdrubal, the Scipio brothers tied down critical enemy armies and resources, preventing Hannibal from receiving the support needed to win.

After Cannae, Rome desperately needed manpower, yet the Senate refused Hannibal's offer to ransom its captured soldiers. This seemingly counterintuitive decision was a powerful psychological statement to Hannibal, their allies, and their own people: there would be no negotiation, only total war, regardless of the human cost.

The Romans often propagandized the concept of 'Punica Fides' or 'Punic Faith' to portray Carthaginians as uniquely treacherous. Yet, their greatest general, Scipio, used blatant deception by feigning peace negotiations with Sifax and Hasdrubal specifically to learn the layout of their camps before burning them down, highlighting the hypocrisy of wartime rhetoric.

After losing Sicily, the Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca and his son Hannibal didn't try to reclaim it directly. Instead, they built a new, resource-rich empire in Spain. Its vast mineral wealth funded a mercenary army, turning Spain into a formidable base from which to launch a revenge war against Rome.

The historian Polybius described the Roman sack of New Carthage, noting the practice of killing indiscriminately—including cutting dogs in half—was a deliberate policy. This was not random brutality but a calculated psychological tactic to inspire terror and ensure swift surrenders in future conflicts.

After his decisive victory at Cannae, Hannibal expected Rome to negotiate terms, as was the norm in ancient warfare. He fatally underestimated their unique, implacable resolve to never capitulate, causing him to miss his window of opportunity to march on the city and enforce a peace.

When asked by Scipio to rank the greatest generals, Hannibal named Alexander, Pyrrhus, and then himself. When Scipio asked where he would rank himself had he won at Zama, Hannibal quipped he would be above all others. This exchange showcases his immense self-regard and sharp wit, demonstrating a psychological resilience that persisted even after his ultimate defeat and exile.