Masinissa, a brilliant Numidian cavalry commander crucial to Carthage's early successes, was not driven by ideology. After Scipio decisively defeated the last Carthaginian army in Spain, Masinissa pragmatically switched his allegiance to the Romans, recognizing they now held the momentum and offered a better path to power.

After Cannae, Rome couldn't defeat Hannibal in open battle, so they adopted a strategy of avoidance, creating a stalemate. For a power on the brink of collapse, simply surviving is a form of victory. This prolonged timeline allowed Rome to regroup, rebuild its manpower, and ultimately go on the offensive.

The Roman war in Spain was less about territorial conquest and more a strategic effort to stop reinforcements from reaching Hannibal in Italy. By engaging Carthaginian forces under Hasdrubal, the Scipio brothers tied down critical enemy armies and resources, preventing Hannibal from receiving the support needed to win.

Rome's political and cultural identity was built on an implacable resolve to never accept defeat or disrespect. This dogged determination, which led them to build a navy from scratch and reject peace talks after catastrophic losses, was their ultimate strategic advantage over more conventional powers.

Publius Cornelius Scipio's youthful glamour, popularity with the masses, and adoption of 'Greek-like' customs made him a uniquely effective and beloved commander. However, these same traits bred deep suspicion among the conservative Roman Senate, who viewed his immense personal power as a threat to the Republic, ultimately leading to his political ruin.

After Cannae, Rome desperately needed manpower, yet the Senate refused Hannibal's offer to ransom its captured soldiers. This seemingly counterintuitive decision was a powerful psychological statement to Hannibal, their allies, and their own people: there would be no negotiation, only total war, regardless of the human cost.

The Romans often propagandized the concept of 'Punica Fides' or 'Punic Faith' to portray Carthaginians as uniquely treacherous. Yet, their greatest general, Scipio, used blatant deception by feigning peace negotiations with Sifax and Hasdrubal specifically to learn the layout of their camps before burning them down, highlighting the hypocrisy of wartime rhetoric.

While battles like Cannae are famous, the Roman victory at Iberra in 215 BC was arguably more critical. By stopping Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal from reinforcing him in Italy just after Rome's greatest defeat, the Scipio brothers prevented a likely Carthaginian victory and changed the course of the war.

After his decisive victory at Cannae, Hannibal expected Rome to negotiate terms, as was the norm in ancient warfare. He fatally underestimated their unique, implacable resolve to never capitulate, causing him to miss his window of opportunity to march on the city and enforce a peace.