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The official default rates in private credit are misleadingly low compared to the BSL market. The reality is a slow grind of "quiet restructurings," like issuing PIK tranches, which delay loss recognition. This hidden stress will likely suppress portfolio returns over the next few years as refinancing becomes harder.

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Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.

The increase in Payment-In-Kind (PIK) debt to 15-25% of BDC portfolios is not a sign of innovative structuring. Instead, it often results from "amend and extend" processes where weakened companies can no longer afford cash interest payments. This "zombification" signals underlying credit deterioration.

Unlike syndicated loans where non-payment is a clear default, private credit has a "third state" where lenders accept PIK interest on underperforming loans. When this "bad PIK" is correctly categorized as a default, the sector's true default rate is significantly higher, around 5% versus 3% for syndicated loans.

Problem loans from the 2021-22 era will take years to resolve due to private credit's tendency to "kick the can." This will lead to a prolonged period of underwhelming mid-single-digit returns, even in a strong economy, rather than a dramatic bust.

A consistent 2-5% of Europe's public high-yield market restructures annually. The conspicuous absence of a parallel event in private markets, which often finance similar companies, suggests that opacity and mark-to-model valuations may be concealing significant, unacknowledged credit risk in private portfolios.

Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.

Lenders allow struggling borrowers to skip cash interest payments by adding the amount to the loan's principal balance. This practice, called 'Payment in Kind' (PIK), hides defaults, artificially inflates asset values, and creates a deceptively low official default rate, masking escalating risk within the system.

A significant valuation gap exists where private credit funds use 'mark-to-model' to value software loans near par. Meanwhile, similar loans in the public CLO market trade at significant discounts (e.g., 70 cents on the dollar). This discrepancy conceals unrealized losses and creates future repricing risk for fund investors.

A key health indicator is "bad" payment-in-kind (PIK) interest—added post-origination due to borrower stress. While this type of PIK saw a slight uptick after rate hikes, total PIK (including "good" PIK planned for growth) remains stable at 7-8% of income and is off its recent peaks, indicating portfolio fundamentals are resilient.

The massive growth of private credit to $1.75 trillion has created an alternative financing source that helps companies avoid default. This liquidity allows them to restructure and later refinance in public markets at lower rates, effectively pushing out the traditional default cycle.

Private Credit Returns Mask Widespread "Quiet Restructurings" and PIK Tranches | RiffOn