The 2020-2021 biotech "bubble" pushed very early-stage companies into public markets prematurely. The subsequent correction, though painful, has been a healthy reset. It has forced the sector back toward a more suitable, long-duration private funding model where companies can mature before facing public market pressures.

China has developed a first-rate biotech effort, enabling U.S. firms to buy or license preclinical assets more efficiently than building them domestically. This creates an arbitrage opportunity, leveraging China's R&D capabilities while relying on U.S. expertise and capital for global commercialization.

Small and mid-cap biotech companies are primarily "capital consumers," making them highly sensitive to interest rates. As the Fed moves toward rate cuts, cheaper capital is expected to unlock significant spending on R&D pipelines and M&A activity, historically making biotech a top-performing sector after the first cut.

The biotech sector lacks mid-cap companies because successful small firms are typically acquired by large pharma before reaching that stage. This creates a barbell structure of many small R&D shops and a few commercial giants. The assets, not the companies, transition from small to large.

Astute biotech leaders leverage the tension between public financing and strategic pharma partnerships. When public markets are down, pursue pharma deals as a better source of capital. Conversely, use the threat of a public offering to negotiate more favorable terms in pharma deals, treating them as interchangeable capital sources.

In a capital-constrained market, positive clinical data can trigger a stock drop for biotechs with insufficient cash. The scientific success highlights an immediate need for a highly dilutive capital raise, which investors price in instantly. Having over two years of cash is now critical to realizing value.

The biotech ecosystem is a continuous conveyor belt from seed funding to IPO, culminating in acquisition by large biopharma. The recent industry-wide stall wasn't a failure of science, but a halt in M&A activity that backed up the entire system.

The "takeout candidate" thesis often fails because corporate development teams at large firms won't risk their careers on optically cheap but unprofitable assets. They prefer to overpay for proven, de-risked companies later, making cheapness a poor indicator of an impending acquisition.

Unlike in tech where an IPO is often a liquidity event for early investors, a biotech IPO is an "entrance." It functions as a financing round to bring in public market capital needed for expensive late-stage trials. The true exit for investors is typically a future acquisition.