The biotech sector lacks mid-cap companies because successful small firms are typically acquired by large pharma before reaching that stage. This creates a barbell structure of many small R&D shops and a few commercial giants. The assets, not the companies, transition from small to large.
Breakthrough drugs aren't always driven by novel biological targets. Major successes like Humira or GLP-1s often succeeded through a superior modality (a humanized antibody) or a contrarian bet on a market (obesity). This shows that business and technical execution can be more critical than being the first to discover a biological mechanism.
A significant portion of biotech's high costs stems from its "artisanal" nature, where each company develops bespoke digital workflows and data structures. This inefficiency arises because startups are often structured for acquisition after a single clinical success, not for long-term, scalable operations.
The most lucrative exit for a startup is often not an IPO, but an M&A deal within an oligopolistic industry. When 3-4 major players exist, they can be forced into an irrational bidding war driven by the fear of a competitor acquiring the asset, leading to outcomes that are even better than going public.
Astute biotech leaders leverage the tension between public financing and strategic pharma partnerships. When public markets are down, pursue pharma deals as a better source of capital. Conversely, use the threat of a public offering to negotiate more favorable terms in pharma deals, treating them as interchangeable capital sources.
A massive disconnect exists where scientific breakthroughs are accelerating, yet the biotech market is in a downturn, with many companies trading below cash. This paradox highlights structural and economic failures within the industry, rather than a lack of scientific progress. The core question is why the business is collapsing while the technology is exploding.
The biotech ecosystem is a continuous conveyor belt from seed funding to IPO, culminating in acquisition by large biopharma. The recent industry-wide stall wasn't a failure of science, but a halt in M&A activity that backed up the entire system.
Unlike in tech where an IPO is often a liquidity event for early investors, a biotech IPO is an "entrance." It functions as a financing round to bring in public market capital needed for expensive late-stage trials. The true exit for investors is typically a future acquisition.
The firm targets markets structured like the famous movie scene: first place wins big, second gets little, and third fails. They believe most tech markets, even B2B SaaS without network effects, concentrate value in the #1 player, making leadership essential for outsized returns.
The next decade in biotech will prioritize speed and cost, areas where Chinese companies excel. They rapidly and cheaply advance molecules to early clinical trials, attracting major pharma companies to acquire assets that they historically would have sourced from US biotechs. This is reshaping the global competitive landscape.
While biotech seems exceptionally volatile, data shows its average 60% annual peak-to-trough drawdown isn't dramatically worse than the ~50% for typical non-biopharma small caps. The perceived risk is disproportionate to the actual incremental volatility required for potentially asymmetric returns.