Contrary to fears of a spike, a major rise in 10-year Treasury yields is unlikely. The current wide gap between long-term yields and the Fed's lower policy rate—a multi-year anomaly—makes these bonds increasingly attractive to buyers. This dynamic creates a natural ceiling on how high long-term rates can go.

Concerns over US term premium have receded partly because the Treasury buyer base has stabilized. The declining share of price-insensitive buyers (Fed, foreign investors, banks), which fell from 75% to 50% over a decade, has finally stopped falling, creating a more supportive demand backdrop.

According to BlackRock's CIO Rick Reeder, the critical metric for the economy isn't the Fed Funds Rate, but a stable 10-year Treasury yield. This stability lowers volatility in the mortgage market, which is far more impactful for real-world borrowing, corporate funding, and international investor confidence.

Despite facing a massive $5.5 trillion funding gap through 2030, the Treasury is expected to delay increases to its coupon auction sizes until November of next year. This decision stems from a slightly improved short-term fiscal outlook and a political desire from the administration to project 'no urgency'.

The early end to the Fed's Quantitative Tightening (QT) is largely irrelevant for year-end funding pressures. The monthly $20 billion runoff is insignificant compared to daily swings in Treasury balances or money market funds. The primary drivers remain bank balance sheet constraints and regulatory hurdles.

The Federal Reserve is expected to buy approximately $280 billion of T-bills in the secondary market next year. This significant demand source provides the Treasury with flexibility, allowing it to temporarily exceed its long-term T-bill share target of 20% without causing market disruption.

Since 2022, highly leveraged hedge funds have bought 37% of net long-term Treasury issuance. This concentration makes the world’s most important market exceptionally vulnerable, as any volatility spike could trigger forced mass selling (degrossing) from these funds.

Lacking demand for long-term bonds, the Treasury issues massive short-term debt. This requires a larger cash balance (TGA) to avoid failed auctions, draining liquidity from the very markets needed to finance this debt, creating a self-reinforcing crisis dynamic.

When the Treasury does increase coupon issuance, it will concentrate on the front-end and 'belly' of the curve, leaving 20 and 30-year bond auctions unchanged. This strategy reflects slowing structural demand for long-duration bonds and debt optimization models that favor shorter issuance in an environment of higher term premiums.