The private credit market is exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of the 2007-2008 subprime crisis. These include major funds blocking investor withdrawals ("gating") and large banks proactively disclosing their exposure, suggesting growing internal anxiety and a desire to manage public perception before a potential downturn.

A key risk for 2026 is the disconnect between stretched market valuations (e.g., tight credit spreads in the 1st percentile) and a macroeconomic environment that doesn't feel late-cycle. This tension suggests that even if growth drives equities higher, it could be accompanied by increased volatility or widening credit spreads.

Don't wait for public credit spreads to blow out as a warning sign. In a system where sovereign debt is the primary vulnerability and corporates are easily bailed out, credit spreads have become a coincident, not leading, indicator. The real leverage risk is hidden in private credit.

The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.

Mainstream economists mistakenly focus on the *level* of private debt. The critical metric is the year-over-year *change* in debt, or credit. This single figure drives aggregate demand and its collapse from +15% to -5% of GDP directly caused the 2008 financial crisis, a crash foreseen by those tracking this data.

History shows that markets with a CAPE ratio above 30 combined with high-yield credit spreads below 3% precede periods of poor returns. This rare and dangerous combination was previously seen in 2000, 2007, and 2019, suggesting extreme caution is warranted for U.S. equities.

The primary risk from rising U.S. debt isn't that businesses and consumers will stop borrowing. It's that investors will reallocate capital from equities to high-yielding bonds, which now offer attractive returns. This shift in investor preference, not a traditional credit crisis, is the key market stress to monitor.

While most US economic cycles appear healthy, the opaque private credit market represents the most significant systemic risk. Recent signs of stress, such as fund redemption limits and high exposure to volatile sectors like software, are reminiscent of the "contained" problems that preceded the 2008 financial crisis.

For 40 years, falling rates pushed 'safe' bond funds into increasingly risky assets to chase yield. With rates now rising, these mis-categorized portfolios are the most vulnerable part of the financial system. A crisis in credit or sovereign debt is more probable than a stock-market-led crash.