Official liquidity measures like Fed balance sheet levels are too slow to be tradable. A better approach is to monitor the symptoms of liquidity conditions in real-time market data. Indicators like SOFR spreads, commercial paper spreads, and unusual yield curve shapes reveal the health of private credit creation.

Drawing from his time at the US Treasury, Amias Gerety explains that recessions are about slowing growth. A financial crisis is a far more dangerous event where fundamental assumptions collapse because assets previously considered safe are suddenly perceived as worthless, causing a "sudden stop" in the economy.

The prevalence of specific, quantifiable deal terms offers a unique window into the market's mood. Rising structural protections for lenders or increased flexibility for borrowers act as an early warning system, reflecting anxieties and optimism before they appear in traditional economic data.

A slowing economy leads rating agencies to downgrade loans. Since Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) have strict limits on lower-rated debt, they become forced sellers. This flood of supply depresses prices further, creating a negative feedback loop that harms even fundamentally sound but downgraded assets.

Veteran investor Jim Schaefer notes a recurring pattern before recessions: a massive, euphoric movement of capital into a specific area (e.g., telecom in 2001, mortgages in 2008). This over-investment inevitably creates systemic problems. Investors should be wary of any asset class currently experiencing such a large-scale influx.

Widespread credit is the common accelerant in major financial crashes, from 1929's margin loans to 2008's subprime mortgages. This same leverage that fuels rapid growth is also the "match that lights the fire" for catastrophic downturns, with today's AI ecosystem showing similar signs.

The underlying math of U.S. debt is unsustainable, but the system holds together on pure confidence. The final collapse won't be a slow leak but a sudden 'pop'—an overnight freeze when investors collectively stop believing the government can honor its debts, a point which cannot be timed.

Citing a lesson from former Goldman Sachs CFO David Viniar, Alan Waxman argues the root cause of financial crises isn't bad credit, but liquidity crunches from mismatched assets and liabilities (e.g., funding long-term assets with short-term debt). This pattern repeats as investors collectively forget the lesson over time.

For 40 years, falling rates pushed 'safe' bond funds into increasingly risky assets to chase yield. With rates now rising, these mis-categorized portfolios are the most vulnerable part of the financial system. A crisis in credit or sovereign debt is more probable than a stock-market-led crash.