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Wigglesworth says Thomas Babington Macaulay rejected the household analogy between an individual debtor and a society indebted to itself. Macaulay argued a vibrant bond market could provide safe collateral and income, helping rather than ruining Britain, and Wigglesworth says that distinction still matters for modern deficit debates.

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Contrary to popular belief, government debt is not the primary cause of economic instability; it's the response. Private debt drives booms and busts. When a private debt bubble bursts, government deficit spending is the essential mechanism that injects money into the economy, preventing a full-blown depression.

Politicians will continue running large deficits as long as the bond market tolerates it by keeping interest rates low. The ultimate correcting mechanism for government spending isn't political discipline, but the bond market's impersonal decision to raise rates, forcing fiscal responsibility.

Wigglesworth says the Dutch sold bonds to fund expensive dikes and flood controls, with hundreds of local waterworks issuing fixed-rate, often perpetual debt. He calls this the first true bond market, and notes that some perpetual bonds from the 1600s still pay interest today, including one owned by the New York Stock Exchange.

The Bank of England's 1694 innovation was to have lenders give money to Parliament, not the monarch. This made debt an obligation of the entire nation and its descendants, creating a stable system for financing wars.

Unlike political pressure or stock market volatility, a sell-off in the government bond market forces fiscal discipline by directly increasing a nation's borrowing costs. This financial pain acts as a powerful, non-negotiable catalyst for governments to address unsustainable spending and debt, as seen in Greece and the UK.

Wigglesworth notes Britain could finance itself almost indefinitely through consols, the world's first true risk-free rate, while France paid two to three times higher interest. He says this financial staying power let Britain subsidize allies for years and frustrate Napoleon, despite France being the era's superpower.

In a model where government spending injects new money into the system, government debt is intrinsically linked to GDP growth. The idea that this debt can grow unsustainably faster than the economy is flawed, as the debt itself is a mechanism for that economic growth.

Despite recent concerns about private credit quality, the most rapid and substantial growth in debt since the GFC has occurred in the government sector. This makes the government bond market, not private credit, the most likely source of a future systemic crisis, especially in a rising rate environment.

The 2022 UK "mini-budget" crisis serves as a stark example of market power. When the government proposed unfunded tax cuts, the bond market reacted instantly and violently, forcing a rapid policy U-turn. This proves that bond markets serve as a powerful disciplinary force against governments pursuing unsustainable fiscal policies.

Wigglesworth says debt-to-GDP is a poor indicator and points to US interest costs around 3.5% of GDP, below many developed countries. He starts to worry near 5% of GDP, where history suggests some countries struggle to reverse course and debt can begin snowballing after that point.