Bonson sold Walmart after a 60% one-year gain turned its average 3.5% yield into 1.5%, and sold Broadcom when its yield fell to 1%. He treats historical dividend yield as a valuation metric and sells when a great company's price creates too much opportunity cost.
Bonson says dividends are cash and 'don't lie,' while EBITDA leaves room for unverifiable growth. He trusts cash in his bank account and watches for slowing dividend growth, which can warn of a cut before management admits it. He says a slowing growth rate may reflect management's own view.
Bonson personally owns 30 to 35 companies, sizing purchases from 1.5%-2% up to 4%. He says 30 names is plenty diversified and you won't find 80 S&P 500 dividend growers; he sells when the thesis breaks or yield compression creates opportunity cost. He does not go lower because positions must matter.
David Bonson says record buybacks coexist with more shares outstanding, so look at net share issuance. He argues many buybacks are executive compensation, not capital return; when trouble hits, buybacks get cut first while dividends tend to persist. He prefers companies actually reducing share count.
Bonson calls them accidental high yielders: a 4% yield on a $100 stock becomes 8% when the price halves, even though the $4 payout is unchanged. He wants yield rising from dividend growth, not just a falling stock price, plus qualitative signs like founder ownership aligning management with shareholders.
Bonson says dividend-growth portfolios have beta around 0.6, and dividend growth has outpaced inflation every calendar year. From 2000 to 2009 the S&P returned 0% while dividend-growth portfolios rose roughly 7-8% annually, he says. That cash-flow growth, not just price defense, is why he sees them as all-weather.
