Creating liquidity in private markets is not about better tech like blockchain. The core challenge is one of market structure: finding a buyer when everyone wants to sell. Without a mechanism to provide a capital backstop during liquidity shocks, technology alone cannot create a functional secondary market.

For large financial institutions, achieving massive scale is a crucial defensive moat. As competitors' balance sheets swell into the trillions, firms like Goldman Sachs must also scale significantly just to maintain their competitive position and relevance in a mature, consolidated industry.

To combat the misconception of easy access to cash, Goldman Sachs has internally banned the common industry term "semi-liquid" for its alternative funds. This linguistic shift is a deliberate risk management strategy to underscore that while these products have liquidity features, they are fundamentally illiquid and access to capital is never guaranteed.

During a financial crisis, even profitable firms face existential threats. The risk isn't from direct exposure to bad assets, but from a systemic "daisy chain" of distrust where counterparties refuse to pay their obligations, leading to a complete liquidity freeze that can bankrupt anyone.

Blockchain's disruption will not impact all of finance equally. Trading firms are safe because market making is a fundamental need. However, intermediaries like banks, exchanges, and custodians face an existential threat as their core function—managing ledgers and access—is directly replaced by blockchain's "private key and a ledger" infrastructure.

To solve the critical illiquidity problem for individual investors, Goldman Sachs operates a proprietary, quarterly secondary market developed over 20 years. This platform allows its wealth clients to list and sell their alternative investment positions, transacting over a billion dollars in NAV annually and providing a crucial liquidity solution.

Morgan Stanley's 1935 founding was a direct consequence of the Glass-Steagall Act, which forced a separation between commercial banking (deposits, loans) and investment banking (trading, underwriting). This regulatory mandate created the specialized firms that define the structure of modern finance today.

Large banks, private credit giants like Apollo and Blackstone, and trading firms are carving out specialized roles. This effectively disaggregates the financial system, recreating the separation between deposit-taking and riskier securities activities that the Glass-Steagall Act once mandated.

Regulations like Dodd-Frank shifted banks from being principal risk-takers to merely financing risk. During market dislocations, banks can no longer absorb selling pressure as they once did. This structural change creates a durable and profitable role for hedge funds to provide liquidity to distressed sellers.