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Unlike internet businesses with near-zero marginal costs, every AI query incurs significant compute and energy expenses. Because AI relies heavily on national infrastructure like the power grid, the government has a more defensible economic argument for demanding an equity stake.
The tech industry wrongly compares AI to software, which has near-zero marginal costs for new users. In reality, providing access to frontier AI models is a zero-sum game during compute crunches because of immense computational requirements. Servicing another user is expensive, leading to rationed access.
While the cost per AI query drops, companies find more complex, compute-intensive uses for it. This elasticity of demand means total AI spending becomes a significant and variable operational expense, similar to a utility bill, rather than a predictable software cost.
The path to a competitive open-source AI ecosystem is blocked by a massive capital moat. The cost of a single gigawatt-scale data center has exploded to $100 billion, making it virtually impossible for anyone outside of big tech or nation-states to fund the necessary compute.
The primary constraint on AI development is not software or algorithms but the physical infrastructure required to support it: power, data centers, and supply chains. Policy will focus on this area regardless of election outcomes, though the specific approach may differ.
The compute power required for AI agents to operate ('inference') is a significant new cost. Without an optimized infrastructure to manage these costs, companies risk spending all their AI-driven productivity gains on 'feeding' their digital workers, making the initiative unprofitable.
Software has long commanded premium valuations due to near-zero marginal distribution costs. AI breaks this model. The significant, variable cost of inference means expenses scale with usage, fundamentally altering software's economic profile and forcing valuations down toward those of traditional industries.
AI companies like OpenAI are losing money on their popular subscription plans. The computational cost (inference) to serve a user, especially a power user, often exceeds the subscription fee. This subsidized model is propped up by venture capital and is not sustainable long-term.
The primary constraint for AI giants like OpenAI and Anthropic is not the supply of chips, but the availability of electrical power and grid infrastructure for data centers. This fundamental chokepoint shifts the strategic advantage to hyperscalers who already control massive power and infrastructure assets.
Geopolitical competition with China has forced the U.S. government to treat AI development as a national security priority, similar to the Manhattan Project. This means the massive AI CapEx buildout will be implicitly backstopped to prevent an economic downturn, effectively turning the sector into a regulated utility.
Drawing a parallel to Intel's early strategy, the immense capital costs of AI development necessitate serving the largest possible market (consumers and businesses). This private, market-driven approach inherently conflicts with government expectations for control, as the government becomes just one of many customers for a globally-scaled technology.