Marks' early career experience losing 95% on 'great' Nifty Fifty stocks taught him a core lesson: no asset is so good it can't be overpriced, and few are so bad they can't be a good investment if cheap enough. This principle of 'buying things well' became his foundation.
Contrary to the industry's bias for action, Howard Marks advocates for strategic inaction, flipping the common saying to 'don't just do something, sit there.' True long-term success comes from owning good assets and letting ideas work, not from constant trading and reacting to short-term market noise.
Marks frames contrarian investing not as simple opposition, but as using the market's excessive force (optimism or pessimism) against itself. This mental model involves letting the market's momentum create opportunities, like selling into euphoric buying, rather than just betting against the crowd.
Despite his reputation, Marks made just five significant macro calls in his career. These were not based on economic forecasts but on 'taking the temperature' of investor behavior when it reached extremes of euphoria or despair. This highlights the rarity of true, high-probability moments to make major portfolio shifts.
During the dot-com bubble, Howard Marks used second-order thinking to stay rational. Instead of asking which tech stocks were innovative (a first-order question), he asked what would happen *after* everyone else piled in. This focus on embedded expectations, rather than simple quality, is key to avoiding overpriced, crowded trades.
In 2008, Howard Marks invested billions with conviction while markets crashed, yet he wasn't certain of the outcome. He held the paradox of needing to act decisively against the crowd while simultaneously accepting the real possibility of being wrong. This mental balance is crucial for high-stakes decisions.
Howard Marks embraces the idea that credit investing is a 'negative art.' Since upside is capped (repayment of principal and interest), superior performance comes from successfully excluding the few investments that will default, not from identifying the absolute best-performing ones among the successes.
Marks emphasizes that he correctly identified the dot-com and subprime mortgage bubbles without being an expert in the underlying assets. His value came from observing the "folly" in investor behavior and the erosion of risk aversion, suggesting market psychology is more critical than domain knowledge for spotting bubbles.
The best investment deals are not deeply discounted, low-quality items like "unsellable teal crocodile loafers." Instead, they are the rare, high-quality assets that seldom come on sale. For investors, the key is to have the conviction and preparedness to act decisively when these infrequent opportunities appear.
In the current late-cycle, frothy environment, maintaining investment discipline is paramount. Oaktree, guided by Howard Marks' philosophy, is intentionally cautious and passing on the majority of deals presented. This discipline is crucial for avoiding the "worst deals done in the best of times" and preserving capital for future dislocations.
Contrary to Modern Portfolio Theory, which links higher returns to higher risk (volatility), Buffett's approach demonstrates an inverse relationship at the point of purchase. The greater the discount to a company's intrinsic value, the lower the risk of permanent loss and the higher the potential for returns. Risk and reward are not a trade-off but are both improved by a cheaper price.