For any given failure mode, there is a point where further technical research stops being the primary solution. Risks become dominated by institutional or human factors, such as a company's deliberate choice not to prioritize safety. At this stage, policy and governance become more critical than algorithms.
The technical toolkit for securing closed, proprietary AI models is now so robust that most egregious safety failures stem from poor risk governance or a lack of implementation, not unsolved technical challenges. The problem has shifted from the research lab to the boardroom.
While discourse often focuses on exponential growth, the AI Safety Report presents 'progress stalls' as a serious scenario, analogous to passenger aircraft speed, which plateaued after 1960. This highlights that continued rapid advancement is not guaranteed due to potential technical or resource bottlenecks.
The primary danger in AI safety is not a lack of theoretical solutions but the tendency for developers to implement defenses on a "just-in-time" basis. This leads to cutting corners and implementation errors, analogous to how strong cryptography is often defeated by sloppy code, not broken algorithms.
AI leaders aren't ignoring risks because they're malicious, but because they are trapped in a high-stakes competitive race. This "code red" environment incentivizes patching safety issues case-by-case rather than fundamentally re-architecting AI systems to be safe by construction.
The most pressing AI safety issues today, like 'GPT psychosis' or AI companions impacting birth rates, were not the doomsday scenarios predicted years ago. This shows the field involves reacting to unforeseen 'unknown unknowns' rather than just solving for predictable, sci-fi-style risks, making proactive defense incredibly difficult.
Technical research is vital for governance because it provides concrete artifacts for policymakers. Demonstrations and evaluations showing dangerous AI behaviors make abstract risks tangible, giving policymakers a clear target for regulation, aligning with advice from figures like Jake Sullivan.
A technology like Waymo's self-driving cars could be statistically safer than human drivers yet still be rejected by the public. Society is unwilling to accept thousands of deaths directly caused by a single corporate algorithm, even if it represents a net improvement over the chaotic, decentralized risk of human drivers.
Other scientific fields operate under a "precautionary principle," avoiding experiments with even a small chance of catastrophic outcomes (e.g., creating dangerous new lifeforms). The AI industry, however, proceeds with what Bengio calls "crazy risks," ignoring this fundamental safety doctrine.
When a highly autonomous AI fails, the root cause is often not the technology itself, but the organization's lack of a pre-defined governance framework. High AI independence ruthlessly exposes any ambiguity in responsibility, liability, and oversight that was already present within the company.
The current approach to AI safety involves identifying and patching specific failure modes (e.g., hallucinations, deception) as they emerge. This "leak by leak" approach fails to address the fundamental system dynamics, allowing overall pressure and risk to build continuously, leading to increasingly severe and sophisticated failures.