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This credit cycle could harm CLOs more than the 2008 crisis. The danger isn't a massive spike in defaults, but rather a prolonged period of moderate defaults combined with historically low recovery rates on those loans. This combination erodes value more effectively than a short, sharp shock.
A slowing economy leads rating agencies to downgrade loans. Since Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) have strict limits on lower-rated debt, they become forced sellers. This flood of supply depresses prices further, creating a negative feedback loop that harms even fundamentally sound but downgraded assets.
Years of low interest rates encouraged risk-taking, resulting in a large pool of low-rated loans (B3/B-). Now, sustained higher rates are stressing these weak capital structures, creating a boom in distressed debt opportunities even as the broader economy performs well.
Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.
Post-crisis stigma has faded, making Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) tranches a top relative value pick in credit markets. The structure allows investors to precisely select risk exposure, from safe AAA tranches with attractive spreads to high-return equity positions, outperforming other credit assets.
The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.
Problem loans from the 2021-22 era will take years to resolve due to private credit's tendency to "kick the can." This will lead to a prolonged period of underwhelming mid-single-digit returns, even in a strong economy, rather than a dramatic bust.
Unlike past recessions where defaults spike and then recede, the current high-rate environment will keep financially weak 'zombie' companies struggling for longer. This leads to a sustained, elevated default rate rather than a sharp, temporary peak, as these firms lack the cash flow to grow or refinance.
Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) have a structural covenant limiting their holdings of CCC-rated (or below) loans to typically 7.5% of the portfolio. As more loans are downgraded past this threshold, managers are forced to sell, even if they believe in the credit's long-term value. This creates artificial selling pressure and price distortions.
Rising default rates in European high-yield are not translating to proportionally higher losses. This is because modern capital structures are dominated by secured debt, leading to exceptionally high recovery rates (70% vs. a historical 40% average), which cushions the overall impact on investors.
The current rise in private credit stress isn't a sign of a broken market, but a predictable outcome. The massive volume of loans issued 3-5 years ago is now reaching the average time-to-default period, leading to an increase in troubled assets as a simple function of time and volume.