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Promotion was based almost entirely on time in service, not merit. This led to absurd situations where a proven general like George Meade was technically junior to the less competent Ambrose Burnside because of their commission dates, forcing convoluted command arrangements during critical campaigns.

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The military's career path rewards generalist experience, effectively punishing officers who specialize in critical fields like AI and cyber. Talented specialists are forced to abandon their expertise to get promoted, leading many to leave the service not for money, but to continue doing the work they excel at.

The telegraph enabled near-instant communication, tempting political leaders like President Lincoln to micromanage military campaigns from afar. However, this often failed, highlighting a timeless tension where communication technology outpaces effective command structures, creating an illusion of control that doesn't actually exist.

The military fails to effectively transfer knowledge between rotating units in a conflict zone. Incoming units often discard their predecessors' experience, believing they can do better, thus repeating the same errors and failing to build on crucial, hard-won lessons.

The policy of rotating commanders on one-year tours was a critical strategic flaw in Afghanistan. Each new commander arrived believing they had the "recipe for success" and would change the strategy, resulting in a series of disconnected, short-term plans that prevented long-term progress.

Despite new technologies, the Civil War's generalship resembled the Napoleonic era more than WWI. Command was dominated by individual personalities and singular decisions, like Pickett's Charge, rather than the vast, impersonal, and bureaucratized military machines that would define 20th-century warfare.

Grant was a brilliant Civil War general because his skills perfectly matched the desperate need for military commanders. However, he was a mediocre president because he meshed poorly with the political environment of the White House. This highlights that leadership skills are not universally transferable; context is everything.

Historian Bruce Catton portrays General George McClellan, the "tech bro of his day," as a brilliant engineer promoted rapidly but too risk-averse to be an effective commander. His story serves as a counterargument to the modern idea that simply elevating technically skilled individuals will produce better military leaders without experiential learning.

Generals had an outsized influence on their armies' institutional character. For example, George McClellan created a cautious, politically fraught culture in the Army of the Potomac, while Robert E. Lee instilled an aggressive ethos in the Army of Northern Virginia, shaping how they fought.

Confederate General Robert E. Lee understood he couldn't win a war of attrition. His strategy centered on high-risk plays, like invading the North, to inflict shocking defeats that would persuade the Northern public the war was unwinnable, thereby electing an administration willing to negotiate peace.

The theory that senior military officers have a duty to speak out against disastrous policies ('McMasterism') fails in practice. The military's promotion system rewards conformity over decades, ensuring that those who reach the top are culturally incapable of publicly challenging their superiors. You don't become a general by telling the principal they are wrong.