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A new class of company operates between private and public markets, accessing vast, public-style capital without the required corporate governance. This allows them to scale to immense valuations before developing a viable business model, creating novel risks.

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The venture market is bifurcated, with a small group of high-profile AI companies—a 'Private Mag 7'—commanding massive valuations based on narrative strength. This elite tier operates in a different reality from the rest of the startup market, which still functions under more normative conditions.

Ultra-late-stage companies like Ramp and Stripe represent a new category: "private as public." They could be public but choose not to be. Investors should expect returns similar to mid-cap public stocks (e.g., 30-40% YoY), not the 2-3x multiples of traditional venture rounds. The asset class is different, so the return profile must be too.

The venue for tech value creation has dramatically shifted from public to private markets. For recent IPOs, over half of their market cap was generated while private, a stark reversal from ten years prior when 88% of value was created post-IPO.

High dilution costs and a focus on narrative-driven stocks (AI, crypto) make public markets unattractive for traditional businesses. These companies now favor private credit for growth capital, creating a bifurcation where public markets are dominated by speculative assets while real economic value stays private.

The most dangerous venture stage is the "breakout" middle ground ($500M-$2B valuations). This segment is flooded with capital, leading firms to write large checks into companies that may not have durable product-market fit. This creates a high risk of capital loss, as companies are capitalized as if they are already proven winners.

Public market investors systematically underestimate sustained high growth (e.g., 60%+), defaulting to models that assume rapid deceleration. This creates an opportunity for private investors with longer time horizons to more accurately value these companies.

Gurley argues that the rise of mega VC funds has fundamentally changed capital markets. These funds convince successful companies like Stripe to stay private longer, effectively 'hijacking' their hyper-growth years from the public markets. This prevents public investors from participating in wealth creation as they did with companies like Amazon.

The abundance of private capital means the most successful companies no longer need to go public for growth funding. This disrupts the traditional VC model, where IPOs are a primary exit path, forcing firms to re-evaluate how and when they achieve liquidity for their limited partners, even for their best assets.

The trend of companies staying private longer and raising huge late-stage rounds isn't just about VC exuberance. It's a direct consequence of a series of regulations (like Sarbanes-Oxley) that made going public extremely costly and onerous. As a result, the private capital markets evolved to fill the gap, fundamentally changing venture capital.

An experienced CFO communicating erratically at OpenAI is a symptom of a larger problem. The private market bubble allows companies to become critical to the economy without ever facing the discipline and transparency required of public entities, creating systemic risk.