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In the 1990s, while governing Fujian province, Xi Jinping circumvented strict quotas on foreign auto joint ventures. He partnered with a Taiwanese firm and argued to Beijing regulators that it was a domestic venture between two Chinese provinces, not a foreign partnership.
To circumvent a state-controlled banking system that favored SOEs, private Chinese automakers sought capital abroad. Brilliance Auto's 1992 IPO on the NYSE, which raised $70 million, occurred five years before even tech giant TSMC went public overseas.
Counterintuitively, U.S. and global auto firms need to collaborate with Chinese suppliers to reduce strategic dependency. The model involves onshoring Chinese hardware and manufacturing expertise while maintaining national control over sensitive AI software and networks, creating a strategic "co-opetition."
Contrary to common belief, China's EV dominance wasn't a top-down mandate. It grew from a mix of entrepreneurs and local officials using personal connections (guanxi) to circumvent regulations and state-owned enterprises, leveraging private and foreign capital.
The city of Wuhu, frustrated by the arrogance of state-owned auto giant FAW, used windfall funds to independently buy an engine assembly line from the UK. This allowed them to launch their own car company, Chery, completely bypassing the established SOE system.
China's industrial policy mirrors a venture capital model: it funds numerous companies in strategic sectors like EVs and batteries, expecting most to fail. This ensures the few survivors, like BYD and CATL, become world-leading giants.
The central government maintains a strong bias toward state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Private firms like Geely were only given the green light for major overseas acquisitions, like Volvo, after all preferred SOE suitors had officially declined the opportunity. Beijing offered approval, but no financial help.
China's government sets top-down priorities like dominating EVs. This directive then cascades to provinces and prefectures, which act as hundreds of competing, state-backed venture capital funds, allocating capital and talent to achieve the national strategic goal in a decentralized but aligned way.
For Chinese officials seeking promotion, establishing a major automaker is a significant political achievement. It serves as a tangible "deliverable" to demonstrate economic stewardship to their superiors. Both Xi Jinping's and Li Qiang's careers feature major automotive project successes.
Contrary to the Western perception of a monolithic state-run system, China fosters intense competition among its provinces. Provincial leaders are incentivized to outperform each other, leading to massive, parallel innovation in industries like EVs and solar, creating a brutally efficient ecosystem.
In the 1990s, China had about 130 carmakers, one for nearly every province. This hyper-fragmentation was a legacy of Maoist-era policies encouraging local self-sufficiency, which made economic sense when central allocation restricted vehicle access.