The post-1980s neoliberal consensus of small government and free trade is being replaced by a mercantilist approach. Governments, particularly the U.S., now actively intervene to protect domestic industries and secure geopolitical strength, treating trade as a zero-sum game. This represents a fundamental economic shift for investors.

To counter the economic threat from China's state-directed capitalism, the U.S. is ironically being forced to adopt similar strategies. This involves greater government intervention in capital allocation and industrial policy, representing a convergence of economic models rather than a clear victory for free-market capitalism.

The current trade friction is part of a larger, long-term bipartisan U.S. strategy of "competitive confrontation." This involves not just tariffs but also significant domestic investment, like the CHIPS Act, to build resilient supply chains and reduce reliance on China for critical industries, a trend expected to persist across administrations.

A U.S. national security document's phrase, "the future belongs to makers," signals a significant policy shift. Credit and tax incentives will likely be redirected from financial engineering (e.g., leveraged buyouts in private equity) to tangible industrial production in order to build resilient, non-Chinese supply chains.

After temporary alliances like 'Red and Tech vs. Blue', the next major political shift will unite the establishment left and right against the tech industry. Blues resent tech's capitalists, Reds resent its immigrants, and the political center blames it for societal ills. This will create a powerful, unified front aiming to curtail tech's influence and wealth.

The long-term health of U.S. fiscal policy appears heavily dependent on a future surge in corporate capital expenditures. This spending is expected to fuel a growth burst specifically in the manufacturing and AI sectors, driven by the strategic imperative to outcompete China.

A nation's leadership class shapes its priorities. China's government, heavily populated by engineers, excels at long-term, systematic infrastructure and technology projects. The US, dominated by lawyers, often gets mired in litigation and short-term cycles, hindering large-scale execution.

To rebuild its industrial base at speed, the US government must abandon its typical strategy of funding many small players. Instead, it should identify and place huge bets on a handful of trusted, patriotic entrepreneurs, giving them the scale, offtake agreements, and backing necessary to compete globally.

In trying to compete, the U.S. is mirroring China's protectionism and industrial policy. This is a strategic error, as the U.S. political system lacks the ability to centrally direct resources and execute long-term industrial strategy as effectively as China's state-controlled economy.