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Originally for blocking competitors, 'Disqualified Lender' (DQ) lists are now used to exclude activist investors, making it easier for sponsors to execute 'kick the can' restructurings. This creates an advantage for unlisted funds.
LPs are developing new selection criteria to filter managers. They will actively screen out GPs who lean too heavily on continuation vehicles as a default liquidity solution or who prioritize scaling their own firm's growth through retail capital, due to concerns about conflicts of interest and alignment.
Major companies like Amazon and financial service providers have integrated the SPLC's 'extremist' list into their compliance pipelines. In some cases, this authority is delegated, meaning a listing by the SPLC can automatically kill a transaction or account application as cleanly as an official government sanction.
Regulations like the 'Accredited Investor' rule, originally designed to shield small investors from risky ventures, are now perceived as gatekeeping. Retail investors argue these rules don't protect them but instead protect the elite's exclusive access to high-growth, wealth-generating opportunities.
Limited Partners (LPs) have become cynical about the overused term "proprietary deal." In response, private equity firms now use the term "direct" to describe deals sourced through their own relationships, outside of a formal auction process. This semantic shift is an attempt to sound more credible and avoid the eye-rolling that "proprietary" now elicits from investors.
For a large fund, selling a $2B position and buying a replacement is a $4B transaction with significant market impact. This illiquidity incentivizes working with a company's board and management to solve problems rather than incurring the high cost of divesting, turning large passive investors into de facto activists.
The best private equity talent often leaves large firms encumbered by non-competes, forcing them to operate as independent, deal-by-deal sponsors. LPs who engage at this stage gain access to proven investors years before they have a marketable track record.
The frequency of aggressive Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) is declining. Sponsors and lenders recognize they operate in a small world and must return to the same markets for future financing. Damaging relationships is no longer tenable, leading to more rational, pro-rata solutions instead of punitive, non-consensual deals.
Originally about solvency, the concept of "reputational risk" is being co-opted by ESG advocates. Financial institutions are pressured to sever ties with politically controversial clients to avoid this newly defined risk, leading to viewpoint-based debanking.
Passive funds from firms like Vanguard and Blackrock outsource their proxy voting to advisors like ISS. These advisors advocate for shareholder primacy in ways that are often inversely correlated with long-term value creation, distorting corporate governance at a massive scale.
The rise of LMEs, where large creditors dictate restructuring terms by providing new money, means smaller investors can be squeezed out. This risk pushes them to sell performing loans at a discount if they sense an LME is coming.