Robinhood's closed-end fund offers retail access to private firms like Stripe. Its structure poses a key risk: the fund's public price can detach from the underlying assets' Net Asset Value (NAV), making it a speculative tool for private market sentiment rather than a direct investment.

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The catalyst for a private credit crisis will be publicly traded, daily NAV funds. These vehicles promise investors daily liquidity while holding assets that are completely illiquid. This mismatch creates the perfect conditions for a "run on the bank" scenario during a market downturn.

Ultra-late-stage companies like Ramp and Stripe represent a new category: "private as public." They could be public but choose not to be. Investors should expect returns similar to mid-cap public stocks (e.g., 30-40% YoY), not the 2-3x multiples of traditional venture rounds. The asset class is different, so the return profile must be too.

Firms like Blue Owl showcase their role in the AI boom, raising billions for data centers. This forward-looking narrative masks a critical risk: they are simultaneously blocking investor redemptions in older, less glamorous funds. This reveals a dangerous liquidity mismatch where retail investors are trapped in the illiquid present while being sold a high-growth future.

To democratize venture capital, ARK created a fund that eliminates the traditional 20% carried interest (a share of profits). Instead, it charges a flat 2.75% management fee. This structure aims to give retail investors with as little as $500 direct access to premier private company cap tables without the performance fees that typically benefit fund managers disproportionately.

During hype cycles, massive venture funding allows startups to offer products below cost to capture market share. If the company fails to achieve a high-value exit, the Limited Partner's capital has effectively been transferred to consumers in the form of discounts, without generating a financial return for the investors.

Despite the allure of direct-to-consumer models after the JOBS Act, the only viable path to retail capital in private markets is through financial advisors at wirehouses and broker-dealers. This channel requires products with liquidity and specific registrations, a fundamentally different approach than institutional fundraising.

Success in late-stage venture resembles trading more than traditional investing—it's about buying and selling on momentum. However, this "new public market" has a critical flaw: while liquidity exists on the way up, it vanishes on the downside, making it impossible to execute a true trading strategy when a correction occurs.

Individual investors buying shares in private AI companies through brokerage platforms are at a significant disadvantage. They are typically last in line behind institutional investors, resulting in higher entry prices and fees, making it a poor strategy for accessing the AI boom.

When private equity firms begin marketing to retail investors, it's less about sharing wealth and more a sign of distress. This pivot often occurs when institutional backers demand returns and raising new capital becomes difficult, forcing firms to tap the public for liquidity.

While retail investors may demand daily pricing for private assets, this eliminates the "hidden benefit" of illiquidity that historically forced a long-term perspective. Constant valuation updates could encourage emotional, short-term trading, negating a core advantage of the asset class: staying the course.