Instead of a total ban, a more strategic approach is to "slow ball" an adversary like China by providing them with just enough technology. This keeps them dependent on foreign suppliers and disincentivizes the massive state investment required to develop their own superior, independent solutions.

The concept of 'weaponized interdependence,' highlighted by China's use of export controls, is driving Asian nations like Japan, India, and South Korea to implement economic security acts. This shifts investment toward domestic supply chains in critical minerals, semiconductors, and defense, creating state-backed opportunities.

To counter the economic threat from China's state-directed capitalism, the U.S. is ironically being forced to adopt similar strategies. This involves greater government intervention in capital allocation and industrial policy, representing a convergence of economic models rather than a clear victory for free-market capitalism.

Instead of crippling China, aggressive US sanctions and tech restrictions are having the opposite effect. They have forced China to accelerate its own domestic R&D and manufacturing for advanced technologies like microchips. This is creating a more powerful and self-sufficient competitor that will not be reliant on the West.

Beijing's focus on AI, EVs, and batteries is primarily a national security strategy. Growth in these sectors is six times smaller than the decline in traditional industries like property, meaning they cannot offset the broader economic collapse.

China’s economic strategy prioritizes technology and manufacturing competitiveness, assuming this will create a virtuous cycle of profits, jobs, and consumption. The key risk is that automated, high-tech manufacturing may not generate enough jobs to significantly boost household income, causing consumer spending to lag behind industrial growth.

The widely reported collapse of China's housing market is not an organic crisis but a state-directed reallocation of capital. By instructing banks to prioritize industrial capacity over mortgages, the government is deliberately shifting funds away from a speculative real estate bubble and into strategic sectors like microchips to counter US sanctions and build self-sufficiency.

Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.

In trying to compete, the U.S. is mirroring China's protectionism and industrial policy. This is a strategic error, as the U.S. political system lacks the ability to centrally direct resources and execute long-term industrial strategy as effectively as China's state-controlled economy.