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Ben Isaac says South Korea is a super attractive market with reforms stacking up and compelling valuations. But family-controlled businesses and complicated holdco structures mean key decision makers may adopt minority-friendly governance more slowly than in Japan; his firm still owns stocks there and expects to continue.
The initial market rally was fueled by highly-leveraged domestic retail investors. With tighter leverage rules, future growth now depends on attracting foreign institutional capital, hinging on corporate governance and capital management reforms.
Analysis in Japan reveals a direct positive correlation between improved corporate governance metrics, such as board independence, and equity returns. This suggests that governance reforms across Asia are not just about compliance but are a tangible source of investment alpha for discerning investors.
Because founding families hold large equity blocks, traditional proxy fights struggle in Korea. Regulations like mandatory cumulative voting allow investors to concentrate votes on single board candidates, while the 3% rule caps controlling shareholder votes in audit elections, establishing meaningful minority leverage.
Although both Asian markets trade at historical discounts, Japan features dispersed public ownership alongside a professional managerial class that facilitates proxy influence. In contrast, Korean corporations remain tightly held by founding families, creating structural hurdles for foreign and activist capital.
'The Assassin' Fahmi Quadir is launching her first-ever long strategy, targeting undervalued Korean companies. She believes her expertise in identifying fraud and obfuscation can be repurposed to unlock value in firms with complex, historically depressed structures amid Korea's corporate governance reforms.
Controlling shareholder groups in South Korea prefer low stock prices because inheritance taxes reach up to 60% when gifting shares. Lower share prices reduce succession tax burdens, motivating families to hoard corporate cash, accumulate non-core assets, and suppress market valuations.
Boards in South Korea historically were not required to disclose acquisition offers or reply to bidders. Proposed bear hug legislation obligates directors to publicly announce takeover proposals and formally defend their rejection rationales, pressuring management to address chronic valuation discounts.
Previously, Korean merger ratios between listed affiliates were calculated strictly using recent trading prices, enabling controlling shareholders to take companies private at severe discounts. The amended act mandates a comprehensive fair valuation weighing share price, asset value, and earnings power.
Unlike typical corporate fraud that inflates value, Korean conglomerates (chaebols) have a history of using transactions to intentionally suppress their asset values. This 'reverse fraud' was a strategy to minimize their massive inheritance tax burden, creating a unique value-unlock opportunity for activists today.
Tiered holding and operating structures permit Korean families to control operating companies and their subsidiaries despite owning very little equity at the holding level. These arrangements depress valuations, shelter management from accountability, and often serve primarily as generational wealth transfer vehicles.