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Evan Conrad says Nvidia benefits from an independent compute market but can't build it: Nvidia would not be neutral enough for traders, and without trading liquidity lenders won't finance against forwards. Hyperscalers and clouds like CoreWeave also can't, because they have too much demand-side inference and cloud business to give up.
To service its massive debt for GPU purchases, CoreWeave locks customers into multi-year contracts. This secures revenue to cover debt payments but means CoreWeave misses out on the higher margins available from rising spot market prices for GPU compute—a calculated trade-off between stability and profitability.
NVIDIA promised to buy any of CoreWeave's unused cloud service availability. This unusual arrangement, while helping CoreWeave secure debt financing, makes it difficult for investors to gauge real, organic market demand for its services, potentially hiding early signs of a market slowdown.
The head of AI at Hudson River Trading highlights a practical barrier to creating a financial market for compute. For serious training, the minimum "lot size" is thousands of GPUs, not a small, fungible unit. This makes it difficult to standardize a contract and create liquidity, unlike commodities with smaller, interchangeable units.
NVIDIA's DGX Cloud, intended to compete with major clouds by layering NeoCloud partners, ultimately shifted to providing a software platform. The initial product wasn't compelling enough to displace direct relationships with providers like CoreWeave, demonstrating the challenge of disintermediating a powerful ecosystem.
A liquid futures market for GPU compute would create price transparency, threatening the business models of hyperscale cloud providers. These giants benefit from opaque, bundled pricing and controlling supply. They will naturally resist the standardization and transparency that an open futures market would bring.
Nvidia retreated from building its own cloud service due to the difficulty and unreliability of its 'cloud of clouds' model, which leased competitor infrastructure. It has now pivoted to a less complex marketplace model, connecting customers to smaller cloud providers instead.
SF Compute argues that for a true compute market to exist, it needs an independent operator that handles physical settlement. This means running the data centers to standardize quality and earn Wall Street's trust, much like an electrical grid operator.
Creating a true commodity market for AI compute is highly challenging because compute is not uniform. Variations in chips, data center design, and specific customer needs make it difficult to establish a standardized physical delivery product or a trusted index, which are prerequisites for a liquid, tradable market.
NVIDIA is not just a supplier and investor in CoreWeave; it also acts as a financial backstop. By guaranteeing it will purchase any of CoreWeave's excess, unsold GPU compute, NVIDIA de-risks the business for lenders and investors, ensuring bills get paid even if demand from customers like OpenAI falters.
Nvidia supports an estimated $588 billion in off-balance sheet financial backstops, including revenue floors and lease guarantees, to assist neoclouds in securing investment-grade financing. Jordan Nanos emphasizes this strategy is pragmatic: Nvidia avoids total dependency on a handful of hyperscalers while nurturing a diversified buyer ecosystem across the entire hardware supply chain, without using meaningful internal GPU compute for self-dealing.