Despite Carthage being militarily crippled after Hannibal's defeat, the psychological trauma of his invasion persisted in Rome. This "biding fear" was irrational given Carthage's weakness but powerfully shaped Roman policy for generations, ultimately leading to the city's destruction.
Rome's political and cultural identity was built on an implacable resolve to never accept defeat or disrespect. This dogged determination, which led them to build a navy from scratch and reject peace talks after catastrophic losses, was their ultimate strategic advantage over more conventional powers.
Roman diplomats employed a strategy of bad-faith negotiation to cripple Carthage's defenses. They first demanded the surrender of all weapons, implying this would suffice. Only after Carthage was completely disarmed did the Romans reveal their true, non-negotiable demand: the city's total destruction.
A Roman faction opposed Cato's call for annihilation, not out of mercy, but from a strategic belief that Rome needed a rival. They argued that the fear of Carthage kept Romans disciplined and on their toes, and that total victory would lead to internal decadence and self-indulgence.
The Romans empowered Massinissa, a Numidian king and their ally, to continuously encroach on Carthaginian territory. This strategy of using a proxy ally kept Carthage weak and created constant border disputes, providing Rome with an eventual pretext for war.
The harsh terms of the First Punic War, which stripped Carthage of territory and imposed a massive indemnity, created deep resentment. This parallels the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, illustrating how overly punitive settlements can sow the seeds of a future war of revenge rather than secure lasting peace.
The historian Polybius described the Roman sack of New Carthage, noting the practice of killing indiscriminately—including cutting dogs in half—was a deliberate policy. This was not random brutality but a calculated psychological tactic to inspire terror and ensure swift surrenders in future conflicts.
While overseeing the final destruction of Carthage, the Roman commander Scipio Aemilianus wept. He was not celebrating victory but contemplating the rise and fall of all great empires—from Troy to Persia—and openly expressed his fear that Rome would one day suffer the same fate.
Roman senator Cato was horrified to find Carthage thriving economically decades after its defeat. He perceived this prosperity—rich hinterlands, upgraded harbors, and stockpiled timber—as a direct threat, proving that a rival's economic resurgence can be a powerful catalyst for preemptive war.
The peace terms imposed by Rome were deliberately designed to ensure Carthage's permanent subjugation. By empowering Rome's ally Masinissa with vague territorial claims against Carthaginian land and forbidding Carthage from waging war without permission, Rome created a pretext for future intervention, effectively turning Carthage into a vulnerable client state.
Centuries after Hannibal's war, the poet Virgil created a foundational myth in "The Aeneid" portraying the conflict with Carthage not as politics but as the fulfillment of a divine curse from Queen Dido. This shaped Roman identity and justified their actions to future generations.