Masinissa, a brilliant Numidian cavalry commander crucial to Carthage's early successes, was not driven by ideology. After Scipio decisively defeated the last Carthaginian army in Spain, Masinissa pragmatically switched his allegiance to the Romans, recognizing they now held the momentum and offered a better path to power.

The Roman war in Spain was less about territorial conquest and more a strategic effort to stop reinforcements from reaching Hannibal in Italy. By engaging Carthaginian forces under Hasdrubal, the Scipio brothers tied down critical enemy armies and resources, preventing Hannibal from receiving the support needed to win.

Roman diplomats employed a strategy of bad-faith negotiation to cripple Carthage's defenses. They first demanded the surrender of all weapons, implying this would suffice. Only after Carthage was completely disarmed did the Romans reveal their true, non-negotiable demand: the city's total destruction.

A Roman faction opposed Cato's call for annihilation, not out of mercy, but from a strategic belief that Rome needed a rival. They argued that the fear of Carthage kept Romans disciplined and on their toes, and that total victory would lead to internal decadence and self-indulgence.

The Romans often propagandized the concept of 'Punica Fides' or 'Punic Faith' to portray Carthaginians as uniquely treacherous. Yet, their greatest general, Scipio, used blatant deception by feigning peace negotiations with Sifax and Hasdrubal specifically to learn the layout of their camps before burning them down, highlighting the hypocrisy of wartime rhetoric.

After losing Sicily, the Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca and his son Hannibal didn't try to reclaim it directly. Instead, they built a new, resource-rich empire in Spain. Its vast mineral wealth funded a mercenary army, turning Spain into a formidable base from which to launch a revenge war against Rome.

Despite Carthage being militarily crippled after Hannibal's defeat, the psychological trauma of his invasion persisted in Rome. This "biding fear" was irrational given Carthage's weakness but powerfully shaped Roman policy for generations, ultimately leading to the city's destruction.

The historian Polybius described the Roman sack of New Carthage, noting the practice of killing indiscriminately—including cutting dogs in half—was a deliberate policy. This was not random brutality but a calculated psychological tactic to inspire terror and ensure swift surrenders in future conflicts.

Roman senator Cato was horrified to find Carthage thriving economically decades after its defeat. He perceived this prosperity—rich hinterlands, upgraded harbors, and stockpiled timber—as a direct threat, proving that a rival's economic resurgence can be a powerful catalyst for preemptive war.