After a decade on the market and multiple shifts in endpoints, Sarepta's definitive Phase 3 study for its DMD drugs failed. This outcome casts doubt on the entire accelerated approval framework for slowly progressive diseases, where surrogate endpoints may not translate to clinical benefit, leaving regulators and patients in a difficult position.

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Unicure's experience reveals a significant regulatory risk: the FDA can reverse its position on a pre-agreed Statistical Analysis Plan (SAP). Despite prior alignment on using a natural history control, the agency later told the company this approach was merely 'exploratory,' invalidating their filing strategy and shocking investors.

Novo Nordisk ran a nearly 4,000-patient Phase 3 Alzheimer's trial despite publicly stating it had a low probability of success. This strategy consumes valuable patient resources, raising ethical questions about whether a smaller, definitive Phase 2 study would have been a more responsible approach for the broader research ecosystem.

The FDA's new pathway for rare disease drugs, based on causal biology, is scientifically promising. However, the name "plausible mechanism" is a critical flaw. The term sounds weak, creating doubt for patients and giving payers powerful leverage to deny coverage by implying a lower standard of evidence.

While the FDA is often blamed for high trial costs, a major culprit is the consolidated Clinical Research Organization (CRO) market. These entrenched players lack incentives to adopt modern, cost-saving technologies, creating a structural bottleneck that prevents regulatory modernization from translating into cheaper and faster trials.

While AI can accelerate the ideation phase of drug discovery, the primary bottleneck remains the slow, expensive, and human-dependent clinical trial process. We are already "drowning in good ideas," so generating more with AI doesn't solve the fundamental constraint of testing them.

Novo Nordisk's large semaglutide Alzheimer's trial failure highlights a critical design flaw: launching a massive study without first using smaller trials to validate mechanistic biomarkers and confirm central nervous system penetration. This serves as a cautionary tale for all CNS drug developers.

The FDA is predicted to approve new PARP inhibitors from trials like AMPLITUDE only for BRCA-mutated patients, restricting use to where data is strongest. This contrasts with the EMA's potential for broader approvals or denials. This highlights the diverging regulatory philosophies that create different drug access landscapes in the US and Europe.

The FDA is shifting policy to no longer allow reliance on immunogenicity data (immunobridging) for approving new or updated vaccines. This move toward requiring full clinical efficacy trials will make it harder to combat evolving pathogens and would have prevented past approvals of key vaccines like those for HPV and Ebola.

Even with strong initial sales, Soleno's stock was punished due to a growing investor fear of the 'launch plateau.' Citing examples like Skyclaris, the market is now skeptical that a few good quarters can be sustained, discounting strong early performance and demanding proof of long-term growth trajectory before rewarding a stock.

The median $40,000 cost per trial enrollee is high because pharma companies essentially run a parallel, premium healthcare system for participants. They pay for all care and level it up globally to standardize the experiment.