Top AI labs and biotech firms are urging the US government to mandate screening for nucleic acid synthesis orders. This pragmatic approach targets a concrete threat—AI-assisted bioweapon creation—rather than abstract superintelligence risks.

Fears of regulatory hurdles for new manufacturing platforms may be overstated. Regulators, familiar with technologies like molecular farming for decades, prioritize the final product's purity, safety, and efficacy. The platform's novelty is secondary to robust scientific data proving the end product's quality.

China's binding regulations mean companies focus safety efforts on the 31 specific risks defined by the government. This compliance-driven approach can leave them less prepared for emergent risks like CBRN or loss of control, as resources are directed toward meeting existing legal requirements rather than proactive, voluntary measures.

A cost-benefit analysis by the Centre for Long-Term Resilience found it is worthwhile for a single country like the UK to mandate DNA synthesis screening. Even if malicious actors can order from unscreened providers abroad, the measure still reduces risk from domestic actors and sets an international precedent.

A significant barrier to voluntary safety pacts among AI companies is antitrust law. An agreement to slow development could be prosecuted as illegal anti-competitive collusion, as it would limit the technology available to consumers. This makes government-led frameworks essential for any coordinated industry action.

In the absence of formal regulation, peptide users have created a decentralized trust system. They import substances from gray-market Chinese suppliers and then pay independent US or European labs to verify purity, creating a crowdsourced quality control process.

The danger of AI creating harmful proteins is not in the digital design but in its physical creation. A protein sequence on a computer is harmless. The critical control point is the gene synthesis process. Therefore, biosecurity efforts should focus on providing advanced screening tools to synthesis providers.

A biosecurity data-level (BDL) framework, modeled after biosafety levels for labs, would keep 99% of biological data open-access. Only the top 1% of data—that which links pathogen sequences to dangerous properties like transmissibility—would face restrictions like requiring use-approval.

While 80% of DNA synthesis companies voluntarily screen orders for dangerous pathogen sequences, the system is not mandatory. This creates a glaring loophole, as a malicious actor can simply place their order with the 20% of companies that do not perform this critical safety check.