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Angela Duckworth describes psychology as a field that embraces complexity, creating individual theories for specific behaviors. Economics, in contrast, prioritizes simple, foundational models and often rejects ideas that don't fit a grand, unifying framework, as exemplified by the University of Chicago school.
The contrast between William James's broad, introspective "Stream of Thought" and the hyper-specific "Batman Effect" study reflects a trend in academia. Professional pressures for publishable, empirical results favor narrow, methodologically rigorous studies over grand, philosophical inquiries that are harder to test.
Fields like economics become ineffective when they prioritize conforming to disciplinary norms—like mathematical modeling—over solving complex, real-world problems. This professionalization creates monocultures where researchers focus on what is publishable within their field's narrow framework, rather than collaborating across disciplines to generate useful knowledge for issues like prison reform.
Work by Kahneman and Tversky shows how human psychology deviates from rational choice theory. However, the deeper issue isn't our failure to adhere to the model, but that the model itself is a terrible guide for making meaningful decisions. The goal should not be to become a better calculator.
Post-WWII, economists pursued mathematical rigor by modeling human behavior as perfectly rational (i.e., 'maximizing'). This was a convenient simplification for building models, not an accurate depiction of how people actually make decisions, which are often messy and imperfect.
Economics-based rational choice theory frames decisions as a calculation of "expected utility," multiplying value by probability. This analogizes complex life choices—from careers to partners—to casino bets, oversimplifying non-quantifiable factors and reducing judgment to mere calculation.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky developed their theories by studying their own cognitive biases. They created simple questions or "riddles" where they knew the logical answer but still felt an intuitive pull toward the wrong one. This self-reflective methodology allowed them to craft experiments that were compelling to non-psychologists like economists.
Contrary to popular belief, economists don't assume perfect rationality because they think people are flawless calculators. It's a simplifying assumption that makes models mathematically tractable. The goal is often to establish a theoretical benchmark, not to accurately describe psychological reality.
Most economists can explain the mechanics of the monetary system, like a plumber explaining pipes. However, they often fail to grasp money's deeper influence as a sexy, dangerous, and motivating force that shapes human desire and societal structure.
For a period, a perverse norm developed in economics where the 'better' academic model was one whose theoretical agents were smarter and more rational. This created a competition to move further away from actual human behavior, valuing mathematical elegance and theoretical intelligence over practical, real-world applicability.
Daniel Kahneman argues that psychology is a foundational discipline for economics because economic models require assumptions about human behavior (the "economic agent"). However, psychology does not depend on economic assumptions. This fundamental asymmetry explains why behavioral economics has flourished, but there's no equivalent 'economic psychology' revolutionizing its parent field.