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The narrative of de-dollarization weakening the dollar is misleading for near-term analysis. The dollar's strength is more correlated with sticky Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows, not portfolio flows. Recent declines in central bank treasury holdings are a typical response to market stress, not a structural shift against the dollar.

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The traditional risk-off reaction of a surging US dollar is less certain now. Unlike the 2008 crisis, where the dollar rally was driven by US entities repatriating funds, the US is now far more exposed to foreign equity outflows. In a major risk-off event, this structural shift could significantly weaken the dollar's safe-haven status.

The danger to the U.S. dollar is not a dramatic replacement by the Euro or RMB, but a slow erosion of its primacy. This is visible in central banks increasing gold reserves, greater hedging activity, and China’s de-dollarization campaign. This gradual shift ultimately raises borrowing costs for the US government and American consumers.

The dollar's decline, particularly in April, was not driven by investors divesting from US assets. Instead, it was caused by investors with large, unhedged dollar exposures belatedly adding hedges. This involves selling dollars in the spot or forward markets, creating downward pressure without actual asset sales.

The narrative of a coordinated "Plaza 2.0" style agreement to weaken the US dollar is likely flawed. The US chose to secure investment commitments from countries like Japan and Korea in recent trade deals, rather than pushing for currency appreciation, indicating its true policy priority.

Current market chatter about reduced demand for U.S. assets is not a sign of a sudden de-dollarization crisis. Instead, it reflects a slow, rational diversification by global investors who are finding better relative value in other developed markets as their local interest rates rise.

Some countries are reducing holdings of US government bonds, but they are often rotating that capital into US equities. Since both are dollar-denominated assets, this trend represents a shift in risk appetite and asset allocation, not a genuine move away from the US dollar system itself.

Talk of de-dollarization ignores the reality of the U.S. current account deficit, which requires selling over a trillion dollars in financial assets annually. As long as the world buys these dollar-denominated assets (debt and equity), the dollar's dominance is structurally reinforced, not diminished.

Counterintuitively, a typical global reserve portfolio has a lower US dollar share (around 57%) than a return-seeking sovereign wealth fund's equity portfolio (up to 80%). The outperformance of US large-cap stocks makes any diversified equity strategy heavily weighted towards the dollar, independent of reserve policy.

Contrary to the de-dollarization narrative, the rise of dollar-pegged stablecoins is poised to increase the dollar's global hegemony. They provide new, efficient digital rails for international transactions, reinforcing the dollar's role as the world's primary settlement currency in the digital age.

Contrary to the common narrative, large equity inflows into the US from the AI theme are not reliably driving dollar strength. History shows Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has a much stronger correlation with FX performance. Currently, timely FDI indicators are not showing a meaningful pickup, suggesting a key support for the dollar is missing.

De-dollarization Fears Are Misplaced; US FDI Inflows Correlate Stronger with USD Than Reserve Holdings | RiffOn