During due diligence, it's crucial to look beyond returns. Top allocators analyze a manager's decision-making process, not just the outcome. They penalize managers who were “right for the wrong reasons” (luck) and give credit to those who were “wrong for the right reasons” (good process, bad luck).

The "Liking-Loving Tendency" causes investors to identify personally with their holdings. They ignore faults, favor associated things, and distort facts to maintain positive feelings. This emotional attachment leads them to rationalize bad news and hold deteriorating assets for too long, destroying capital.

Post-mortems of bad investments reveal the cause is never a calculation error but always a psychological bias or emotional trap. Sequoia catalogs ~40 of these, including failing to separate the emotional 'thrill of the chase' from the clinical, objective assessment required for sound decision-making.

Deciding to pivot isn't about perseverance; it's a cold, rational decision made when you've exhausted all non-ridiculous ideas for success. The main barrier is emotional—it's "fucking humiliating" to admit you were wrong. The key is to separate the intellectual decision from the emotional cost.

Elite decision-making transcends pure analytics. The optimal process involves rigorously completing a checklist of objective criteria (the 'mind') and then closing your eyes to assess your intuitive feeling (the 'gut'). This 'educated intuition' framework balances systematic analysis with the nuanced pattern recognition of experience.

To combat the emotional burden of binary sell-or-hold decisions, use the "Go Havsies" method. Instead of selling a full position, sell half. This simple algorithm diversifies potential outcomes—you benefit if it rises and are protected if it falls—which significantly reduces the psychological pain of regret from making the "wrong" choice.

To combat the urge for constant activity, which often harms returns, investor Stig Brodersen intentionally reviews his portfolio's performance only once a year. This forces a long-term perspective and prevents emotional, short-sighted trading based on market fluctuations.

Investors rarely sell a fund for outperforming its benchmark too aggressively, but they should consider it. Research by Vanguard's John Bogle tracked the top 20 funds of each decade and found they almost always became significant underperformers in the following decade, demonstrating the danger of chasing past winners.

Even long-term winning funds will likely underperform their benchmarks in about half of all years. A Vanguard study of funds that beat the market over 15 years found 94% of them still underperformed in at least five of those years. This means selling based on a few years of poor returns is a flawed strategy.