While platform businesses (marketplaces) can achieve massive valuations, they are incredibly difficult and expensive to build due to the chicken-and-egg problem. For most founders, a traditional B2B SaaS model is a far safer and more direct path to success.

The slow growth of public SaaS isn't just an execution failure; it's a structural problem. We created so many VC-backed companies that markets became saturated, blocking adjacent expansion opportunities and creating a 'Total Addressable Market (TAM) trap'.

A significant shift has occurred: private equity firms are no longer actively pursuing acquisitions of solid SaaS companies that fall short of IPO scale. This disappearance of a reliable exit path forces VCs and founders to find new strategies for liquidity and growth.

Venture capitalists may value a solid $15M revenue company at zero. Their model is not built on backing good businesses, but on funding 'upside options'—companies with the potential for explosive, outlier growth, even if they are currently unprofitable.

Ambitious bootstrappers should reconsider building horizontal SaaS products. These broad markets are now flooded with well-funded, AI-first competitors, creating intense headwinds that cause bootstrapped companies to plateau hard in the low-seven-figure ARR range.

This provides a simple but powerful framework for venture investing. For companies in markets with demonstrably huge TAMs (e.g., AI coding), valuation is secondary to backing the winner. For markets with a more uncertain or constrained TAM (e.g., vertical SaaS), traditional valuation discipline and entry price matter significantly.

For years, founders of profitable but slow-growing SaaS companies could rely on a private equity acquisition as a viable exit. That safety net is gone. PE firms are now just as wary of AI disruption and growth decay as VCs, leaving many 'pretty good' SaaS companies with no buyers.

While impressive, hypergrowth from zero to $100M+ ARR can be a red flag. The mechanics enabling such speed, like low-friction monthly subscriptions, often correlate with low switching costs, weak product depth, and poor long-term retention, resembling consumer apps more than enterprise SaaS.

The boom in tools for data teams faded because the Total Addressable Market (TAM) was overestimated. Investors and founders pattern-matched the data space to larger markets like cloud and dev tools, but the actual number of teams with the budget and need for sophisticated data tooling proved to be much smaller.