Private equity managers often get psychologically anchored to their purchase price. Instead of cutting losses on a poorly performing asset to redeploy time and capital, they hold on in the vain hope of getting their money back, turning a bad deal into a time-consuming, mediocre one.

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The market's liquidity crisis is driven by a fundamental disagreement. Limited Partners (LPs) suspect that long-held assets are overvalued, while General Partners (GPs) refuse to sell at a discount, fearing it will damage their track record (IRR/MOIC) and future fundraising ability. This creates a deadlock.

The "Liking-Loving Tendency" causes investors to identify personally with their holdings. They ignore faults, favor associated things, and distort facts to maintain positive feelings. This emotional attachment leads them to rationalize bad news and hold deteriorating assets for too long, destroying capital.

Combat indecision and emotional attachment by pre-committing to sell an investment if it fails to meet a specific metric (the state) by a specific deadline (the date). This creates a pre-commitment contract that closes long feedback loops and prevents complacency with underperforming assets.

Post-mortems of bad investments reveal the cause is never a calculation error but always a psychological bias or emotional trap. Sequoia catalogs ~40 of these, including failing to separate the emotional 'thrill of the chase' from the clinical, objective assessment required for sound decision-making.

To avoid emotional, performance-chasing mistakes, write down your selling criteria in advance and intentionally exclude recent performance from the list. This forces a focus on more rational reasons, such as a broken investment thesis, manager changes, excessive fees, or shifting personal goals, thereby preventing reactionary decisions based on market noise.

Deciding whether to invest more capital into a struggling portfolio company is a major point of conflict. The management team advocates strongly for the infusion, believing it can turn things around. However, investor experience shows that such 'bridge' rounds are rarely successful, making it a difficult decision.

GPs are holding assets longer not just due to market conditions, but out of fear for their own business. They believe extending the hold period will allow underlying business growth to eventually hit their crucial Multiple on Invested Capital (MOIC) targets, which is critical for successfully raising their next fund.

To decide whether to sell a long-held asset you're attached to, imagine it was sold overnight and the cash is in your account. The question then becomes: "Would you use that cash to buy it back today?" This reframe bypasses status quo bias and the endowment effect, making the correct decision immediately obvious.

Corporate leaders are incentivized and wired to pursue growth through acquisition, constantly getting bigger. However, they consistently fail at the strategically crucial, but less glamorous, task of divesting assets at the right time, often holding on until value has significantly eroded.

GPs are caught between two conflicting goals. They can hold assets longer, hoping valuations rise to meet their paper marks and maximize returns. Or, they can sell now at a potential discount to satisfy LPs' urgent need for liquidity, thereby securing goodwill for future fundraises. This tension defines the current market.