The core structural threat to political incumbents is now from primary challengers, not the general election. This forces candidates to appeal to their party's most extreme base rather than the median voter, creating a system that structurally rewards polarization and discourages broad-based governance.

Our default method for promotion—open competition—is flawed because it disproportionately attracts and rewards individuals who most desire power, not necessarily those best suited for leadership. The Founding Fathers understood this, preferring reluctant leaders. Alternative models, like deliberation by a select body, can produce more competent and less self-interested leaders.

According to James Burnham's "Iron Law of Oligarchy," systems eventually serve their rulers. In government, deficit spending and subsidies are used to secure votes and donor funding, meaning leaders are incentivized to maintain the flow of money, even if it's wasteful or fraudulent, to ensure their own political survival.

The appeal of a populist leader lies in their rejection of traditional political norms. When the electorate feels betrayed by the established "political class," they gravitate toward figures whose rhetoric is a deliberate and stark contrast, signaling they are an outsider.

Electoral systems have an adverse selection problem, favoring narcissistic, Machiavellian, and psychopathic individuals who seek power. A lottery system, by contrast, selects a more representative and less pathologically power-hungry group of leaders, avoiding those who excel at manipulative charm to get elected.

When leaders are chosen by lottery instead of election, they are less likely to feel they are "the chosen one." This fosters a sense of duty, humility, and servant leadership because they recognize their position is due to chance, not special merit. This structure serves as a protective mechanism against the selfishness and hubris often seen in politics.

Yang argues the most impactful political action is not holding office but reforming the system itself. He advocates for structural changes like nonpartisan primaries, believing that fixing the underlying incentives is the highest-leverage way to produce better outcomes for society.

Expecting politicians to vote themselves out of a job is unrealistic. The path to reform is a bottom-up approach, using numerous local citizen assemblies to prove their value. When politicians realize these assemblies can solve problems and reconcile people with the system, they will adopt them to secure their own legitimacy and hold onto power.

Public goods are either "competitive" (schools, roads), suitable for electoral debate, or "unitary" (redistricting, judicial appointments), requiring non-partisan consensus. Applying competitive electoral logic corrupts unitary goods. Representation by sampling, like a jury, is the appropriate, unbiased mechanism to govern these essential functions that underpin the rules of the game.