Upcoming mega-IPOs from companies like OpenAI and SpaceX will likely feature dual-class share structures. This mechanism grants certain insiders, typically founders, shares with outsized voting power (e.g., 10 votes per share). This allows them to retain control over the company's strategic direction even after diluting their economic ownership by going public.

Liberty Global's board is filled with long-serving directors, many in their 70s and 80s, with relatively low stock ownership. In a controlled company, this composition suggests a lack of fresh perspectives and alignment, potentially enabling a long track record of value destruction to continue unchecked without pushback on management.

Activists can be effective even in companies with dual-class shares or founder control. The mechanism for influence is not the threat of a proxy fight but the power of good ideas and relationships to achieve strategic alignment with the controlling party.

Reflecting on his public company experience, Zayo's CEO advises creating super-voting shares for insiders during an IPO. This concentrates control and makes the company a much less appealing target for activist investors who can't easily gain influence.

As part of its equity deal with Intel, the U.S. government has agreed to vote its 9.9% stake according to the board's recommendations. This arrangement effectively hands the board a powerful, stable voting bloc, insulating management from shareholder activism and reinforcing the existing power structure.

Disney is uniquely "breakable" because it lacks common defense mechanisms like a poison pill or a staggered board. Its annually elected board makes it highly vulnerable to activist campaigns seeking to replace directors and force a sale.

Angel Studios' founders frame their SPAC not as a capital raise but as a mission-preservation vehicle. They used a "SPAC in name only" to go public while installing a favorable board and super-voting shares, insulating their unique, guild-driven model from typical market pressures.

Profitable, self-funded public companies that consistently use surplus cash for share repurchases are effectively executing a slow-motion management buyout. This process systematically increases the ownership percentage for the remaining long-term shareholders who, alongside management, will eventually "own the whole company."

Despite his reputation as a frugal, shareholder-focused operator, John Malone has a pattern of significantly overcompensating executives at his companies like Warner Bros. Discovery. This practice raises questions about his alignment with common shareholders and contrasts with his public persona of "eating his own cooking."